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Abstract
Consider two data providers, each maintaining private records of different feature sets about
common entities. They aim to learn a linear model jointly in a federated setting, namely, data is
local and a shared model is trained from locally computed updates. In contrast with most work
on distributed learning, in this scenario (i) data is split vertically, i.e. by features, (ii) only one
data provider knows the target variable and (iii) entities are not linked across the data providers.
Hence, to the challenge of private learning, we add the potentially negative consequences of
mistakes in entity resolution.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we describe a three-party end-to-end solution in two
phases—privacy-preserving entity resolution and federated logistic regression over messages
encrypted with an additively homomorphic scheme—, secure against a honest-but-curious
adversary. The system allows learning without either exposing data in the clear or sharing
which entities the data providers have in common. Our implementation is as accurate as a naive
non-private solution that brings all data in one place, and scales to problems with millions
of entities with hundreds of features. Second, we provide what is to our knowledge the first
formal analysis of the impact of entity resolution’s mistakes on learning, with results on how
optimal classifiers, empirical losses, margins and generalisation abilities are affected. Our
results bring a clear and strong support for federated learning: under reasonable assumptions
on the number and magnitude of entity resolution’s mistakes, it can be extremely beneficial to
carry out federated learning in the setting where each peer’s data provides a significant uplift to
the other.
∗All authors contributed equally. Richard Nock is jointly with the Australian National University & the University
of Sydney. Giorgio Patrini is now at the University of Amsterdam.
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Figure 1: Relationships between the Coordinator, C, and the Data Providers, A and B.
1 Introduction
With the ever-expanding collection and use of data, there are increasing concerns about security
and privacy of the data that is being collected and/or shared (Esperança et al. [2017] and references
therein). These concerns are both on the part of the consumer, whose information is often used
or traded with little consent, and on the part of the collector, who is often liable for protecting the
collected data.
On the other hand, organisations are increasingly aware of the potential gain of combining their
data assets, specifically in terms of increased statistical power for analytics and predictive tasks.
For example, banks and insurance companies could collaborate for spotting fraudulent activities;
hospitals and medical facilities could leverage the medical history of common patients in order
to prevent chronic diseases and risks of future hospitalisation; and online businesses could learn
from purchase patterns of common users so as to improve recommendations. There is little work
on systems that can make use of distributed datasets for federated learning in a sufficiently secure
environment, and even less any formal analysis of such a system, from the security and learning
standpoint.
Contributions — In this paper, we provide both:
• First, we propose an end-to-end solution for the case where two organisations hold different
data about (undisclosed) common entities. Two data providers, A and B, see only their
own side of a vertically partitioned dataset. They aim to jointly perform logistic regression
in the cross-feature space. Under the assumption that raw data cannot be exchanged, we
present a secure protocol that is managed by a third party C, the coordinator, by employing
privacy-preserving entity resolution and an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. This
is our first contribution. Relationships between A, B and C are presented in Figure 1.
• Our second contribution is the first formal study of an often overlooked source of errors
of this process: the impact of entity resolution errors on learning. Since A and B use
different descriptive features, linking entities across databases is error prone [Christen, 2012].
Intuitively we might expect such errors to have negative impact on learning: for example,
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wrong matches of a hospital database with pharmaceutical records with the objective to
improve preventive treatments could be disastrous. Case studies report that exact matching
can be very damaging when identifiers are not stable and error-prone: 25% true matches
would have been missed by exact matching in a census operation [Schnell, 2013, Winkler,
2009]. We are not aware of results quantifying the impact of error-prone entity-resolution
on learning. Such results would be highly desirable to (i) find the key components of entity
resolution errors that impact learning the most and then (ii) devise improvements of entity-
resolution algorithms in a machine learning context. We provide in this paper four main
contributions from that standpoint.
– First, we provide a formal bound on the deviation of the optimal classifier when such
errors occur. It shows for example that wrongly linking examples of different classes
can be significantly more damaging than wrongly linking examples of the same class.
– Second, we show that under some reasonable assumptions, the classifier learned is
immune to entity-resolution mistakes with respect to classification for large margin
examples. More precisely, examples that receive a large margin classification by the
optimal (unknown) classifier still receive the same class by the classifier we learn from
mistake-prone entity-resolved data.
– Third, under the same assumptions, we bound the difference between the empirical
loss of our classifier on the true data (i.e. built knowing the true entity-resolution) with
respect to that of the optimal (unknown) classifier, and it shows a convergence of both
losses at a rate of order 1/nα, where n is the number of examples and α ∈ (0, 1] is an
assumption-dependent constant. The bound displays interesting dependencies on three
distinct penalties respectively depending on the optimal classifier, entity resolution and
a sufficient statistics for the class in the true data.
– Fourth, under the additional assumption that entity resolution mistakes are small enough
in number, we show that not even rates for generalization are notably affected by entity
resolution. The same key penalties as for the empirical loss bounds appear to drive
generalization bounds.
These contributions, we believe, represent very strong advocacies for federated learning when
aggregating databases provides a significant uplift for classification accuracy.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 presents the
security environment and primitives. Section 4 details our approach for privacy-preserving entity-
resolution. Section 5 develops our approach for secure logistic regression. Section 7 investigates the
formal properties of learning in a federated learning setting that relies on entity resolution. Section
8 presents and discusses experiments. We provide a conclusion in the last section. An appendix,
starting page 25, provides all proofs and details on encryption, encoding, security evaluation and
cryptographic longterm keys.
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2 Related work
The scenario is federated learning [Konecný et al., 2016, McMahan et al., 2017], a distributed
setting where data does not leave its premises and data providers protect their privacy against a
central aggregator. Our interest is logistic regression on vertically partitioned data and, importantly,
we consider additional privacy requirements and entity resolution with a given error rate.
Research in privacy-preserving machine learning is currently dominated by the approach of
differential privacy [Dwork, 2008, Dwork and Roth, 2014]. In the context of machine learning, this
amounts to ensuring—with high probability—that the output predictions are the same regardeless
of the presence or absence of an individual example in the dataset. This is usually achieved by
adding properly calibrated noise to an algorithm or to the data itself [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni,
2009, Duchi et al., 2013]. While computationally efficient, these techniques invariably degrade the
predictive performance of the model.
We opt for security provided by more traditional cryptographic guarantees such as homomorphic
encryption, e.g. Paillier [Paillier, 1999] or Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan cryptosystems [Gentry,
2009], secure multi-party computation, e.g. as garbled circuits [Yao, 1986] and secret sharing
[Ben-Or et al., 1988]. By employing additively homomorphic encryption, we sit in this space.
In contrast with differential privacy, instead of sacrificing predictive power, we trade security for
computational cost—the real expense of working with encryption.
Work in the area can be classified in terms of whether the data is vertically or horizontally
partitioned, the security framework, and the family of learning models. We limit ourselves to
mention previous work with which we have common elements. The overwhelming majority of
previous work on secure distributed learning considers a horizontal data partition. Solutions can
take advantage of the separability of loss functions which decompose the loss by examples. Relevant
approaches using partially homomorphic encryption are Xie et al. [2016], Aono et al. [2016].
A vertical data partition requires a more complex and expensive protocol, and therefore is less
common. Wu et al. [2013] run logistic regression where one party holds the features and the other
holds the labels. Duverle et al. [2015] use the Paillier encryption scheme to compute a variant of
logistic regression which produces a p-value for each feature separately (rather than a logistic model
as we do here). Their partition is such that one party holds the private key, the labels and a single
categorical variable, while the other party holds all of the features. Gascón et al. [2017] perform
linear regression on vertically partitioned data via a hybrid multi-party computation combining
garbled circuits with a tailored protocol for the inner product. Recently, Mohassel and Zhang [2017]
presented a system for privacy-preserving machine learning for linear regression, logistic regression
and neural network training. They combine secret sharing, garbled circuits and oblivious transfer
and rely on a setting with two un-trusted, but non-colluding servers.
None of the papers cited before consider the problem of entity resolution (or entity matching,
record linkage, Christen [2012]). For example, Gascón et al. [2017] assume that the correspondence
between rows in the datasets owned by different parties is known a priori. Such an assumption
would not stand many real-world applications where identifiers are not stable and/or recorded with
errors [Schnell, 2013, Winkler, 2009], making entity matching a prerequisite for working with
vertically partitioned in most realistic scenarios. Finding efficient and privacy-compliant algorithms
is a field in itself, privacy-preserving entity resolution [Hall and Fienberg, 2010, Christen, 2012,
Vatsalan et al., 2013a].
Table 1 summarizes some comparisons between our setting and results to others. Perhaps
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Vertical partition X X X X 7 7 7 7
Convergence X X 7 7 X X 7 X
ER X 7 7 7
Table 1: Comparison of related approaches on federated learning, (from top row to bottom row)
whether they rely on vertically partitioned data, analyze convergence and/or entity resolution (ER);
the presence of ER is justified only in case of vertical partition.
surprisingly, there is an exception to that scheme: it was recently shown that entity resolution is not
necessary for good approximations of the optimal model. Related methods exploit the fact that one
can learn from sufficient statistics for the class instead of examples [Nock et al., 2015, Nock, 2016,
Patrini, 2016], many of which do not require entity resolution to be computed, but rather a weak
form of entity resolution between groups of observations that share common subset of features
[Patrini et al., 2016b]. To our knowledge, Patrini et al. [2016b] is also the only work other than ours
to study entity resolution and learning in a pipelined process, although the privacy guarantees are
different. Crucially, it requires labels to be shared among all parties, which we do not, and also the
theoretical guarantees are yet not as comprehensive as the ones we are going to deliver.
3 Security environment and primitives
Security model — We assume that the participants are honest-but-curious: (i) they follow the
protocol without tampering with it in any way; (ii) they do not collude with one another; but
(iii) they will nevertheless try to infer as much as possible from the information received from the
other participants. The honest-but-curious assumption is reasonable in our context since A and
B have an incentive to compute an accurate model. The third party, C, holds the private key used for
decryption; however the only information C receives from A and B are encrypted model updates,
which we do not consider private in our setup.
We assume that A and B’s data is secret, but that the schema (the number of features and the type
of each) of each data provider is available to all parties. We assume that the agents communicate on
pre-established secure channels. We work under additional privacy constraints:
1. Knowledge of common entities remain secret to A and B, as does the number of common
entities.
2. No raw sensitive data leaves A or B before encryption.
On the other hand, a data provider can safely use its own unencrypted records locally anytime it is
useful to do so.
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Additively homomorphic encryption — We recall here the main properties of additively homo-
morphic encryption schemes such as Paillier [1999]. As a public key system, any party can encrypt
their data with a known public key and perform computations with data encrypted by others with the
same public key. To extract the plaintext, the result needs to be sent to the holder of the private key.
An additively homomorphic encryption scheme only provides arithmetic for elements of its
plaintext space. In order to support algorithms over floating-point numbers, we must define an
encoding scheme that maps floats to modular integers and which preserves the operations of addition
and multiplication. The encoding system we use is similar to floating-point representation; a number
is encoded as a pair consisting of an encrypted significand and a unencrypted exponent. Details of
the encoding scheme and its limitations are given in Appendix II.
An additively homomorphic encryption scheme provides an operation that produces the encryp-
tion of the sum of two numbers, given only the encryptions of the numbers. Let the encryption of a
number u be [[u]]. For simplicity we overload the notation and we denote the operator with ‘+’ as
well. For any plaintexts u and v we have:
[[u]] + [[v]] = [[u+ v]]. (1)
Hence we can also multiply a ciphertext and a plaintext together by repeated addition:
v · [[u]] = [[vu]], (2)
where v is not encrypted (it is not possible to multiply two ciphertexts). In short, we can compute
sums and products of plaintexts and ciphertexts without leaving the space of encrypted numbers.
These operations can be extended to work with vectors and matrices component-wise. For
example, we denote the inner product of two vectors of plaintexts u and v by v> [[u]] = [[v>u]]
and the component-wise product by v ◦ [[u]] = [[v ◦ u]]. Summation and matrix operations work
similarly; see Appendix I for details. Hence, using an additively homomorphic encryption scheme
we can implement useful linear algebra primitives for machine learning.
Doing arithmetic on encrypted numbers comes at a cost in memory and processing time. For
example, with Paillier encryption scheme, the encryption of an encoded floating-point number
(whether single or double precision) is 2m bits long, where m is typically at least 1024 [BlueKrypt,
2017] and the addition of two encrypted numbers is two to three orders of magnitude slower
than the unencrypted equivalent. Nevertheless, as we will see later, with a carefully engineered
implementation of the encryption scheme, a large proportion of real-world problems are tractable.
4 Privacy-preserving entity resolution
When a dataset is vertically partitioned across organisations the problem arises of how to identify
corresponding entities. The ideal solution would be joining datasets by common unique IDs;
however, across organisations this is rarely feasible. An approximate solution is given by techniques
for entity resolution [Christen, 2012]; Figure 2 gives a pictorial representation. Solving this problem
is a requirement for learning from the features of the two parties.
In a non-privacy-preserving context, matching can be based on shared personal identifiers,
such as name, address, gender, and date of birth, that are effectively used as weak IDs. In our
scenario however, weak identifiers are considered private to each party. Thus, in order to perform
6
Figure 2: The problem of entity resolution.
Algorithm 1: Privacy-preserving entity matching
Data: personal identifiers for entities in DA and DB
Result: Permutations σ, τ and maskm
A and B
create a CLK for every entity and send them to C
C
obtain σ, τ andm by matching CLKs
encrypts [[m]]
sends σ and τ to A and B respectively and [[m]] to both
privacy-preserving entity resolution we use an anonymous linking code called a cryptographic
longterm key (CLK) introduced by Schnell et al. [2011].
The CLK is a Bloom filter encoding of multiple personal identifiers. The encoding method
works by hashing n-gram sub-strings of selected identifiers to bit positions in the Bloom filter. A
measure of similarity between CLKs is computed on the number of matching bits by the Dice
coefficient [Schnell et al., 2011].1
The protocol for privacy-preserving entity matching is shown in Algorithm 1. After CLKs of
all entities from A and B are received, C matches them by computing the Dice coefficient for all
possible pairs of CLKs, resulting in a number of comparisons equal to the product of the datasets
sizes. The most similar pairs are selected as matches, in a greedy fashion. Faster computation is
possible by blocking [Vatsalan et al., 2013b].
The outputs of entity matching are two permutations σ, τ and a maskm: σ, τ describe how A
and B must rearrange their rows so as to be consistent with each other;m specifies whether a row
corresponds to an entity available in both data providers, thus to be used for learning. The encrypted
mask and its integration into the process of private learning is novel and part of our contribution.
No assumption was made on their relative size. For the learning phase though, they must be the
same. Hence the longer dataset is truncated, excluding only non-matched entities.2
1While CLKs are robust to typographical errors, they are susceptible to cryptanalytic attacks if insecure parameters
are used, or if too few identifiers are hashed [Kuzu et al., 2011, 2013, Niedermeyer et al., 2014].
2As a consequence, the owner of the longer dataset will learn that the truncated rows have no correspondence on the
other dataset. This is a mild leak of information that does not violate the first security requirement in Section 3.
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regression.
More precisely, entity resolution of DA and DB relative to CLKs consists of two permutations σ
and τ of the rows of DA and DB, and a mask m of length n whose elements i satisfy
mi =
{
1 if σ(DCLKA )i ∼ τ(DCLKB )i , and
0 otherwise.
(3)
The operator ‘∼’ can be read as “the most likely match”, in the sense of Schnell et al. [2011].
Permutations and mask are randomized subject to the relation (3), where mi = 0 means that there is
no record in the other dataset which could match with a high enough probability.
In our scenario, whether a record in a data provider is a match is considered private; see
requirement 1. in Section 3. For example, when linking to a medical dataset of patients, successful
matching of an entity could reveal that a person in an unrelated database suffers the medical
condition. In order to keep the mask confidential, C encrypts it with the Paillier scheme before
sending it to A and B. Details on the use of mask are given in Section 6.
5 Logistic regression, Taylor approximation
We need to adapt logistic regression and stochastic gradient descent to work with an additively
homomorphic encryption scheme and the masks. In this section the focus is on the “non-distributed”
setting—all data is available in one place—, while Section 6 details the federated learning protocol.
With logistic regression we learn a linear model θ ∈ Rd that maps examples x ∈ Rd to a
binary label y ∈ {−1, 1}. The learning sample S is a set of n example-label pairs (xi, yi) from
i = 1, . . . , n. Figure 3 presents the notation used in this section, showing in particular that the
8
Figure 4: Loss profiles.
observation matrix is used row-wise. The average logistic loss computed on the training set is
`S(θ) =
1
n
∑
i∈S
log(1 + e−yiθ
>xi). (4)
In turn, the stochastic gradients computed on a mini-batch S ′ ⊆ S of size s′ are
∇`S′(θ) = 1
s′
∑
i∈S′
(
1
1 + e−yθ>x
− 1
)
yixi. (5)
Below we adapt equations (4) and (5) to accommodate the encrypted mask. Learning requires the
computation of gradients only, not of the loss itself. Yet, to combat overfitting we monitor the loss
function on a hold-out for early stopping, other than using ridge regularization. From now on, we
denote `H as the loss value on a hold-out H of size h.
Taylor loss — In order to operate under the constraints imposed by an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme, we need to consider approximations to the logistic loss and the gradient. To
achieve this, we take a Taylor series expansion of log(1 + e−z) around z = 0:
log(1 + e−z) = log 2− 1
2
z + 1
8
z2 − 1
192
z4 +O(z6). (6)
The second order approximation of (4) evaluated on H is:
`H(θ) ≈ 1
h
∑
i∈H
log 2− 1
2
yiθ
>xi +
1
8
(θ>xi)2, (7)
where we have used the fact that y2i = 1 ,∀i. We call this function the Taylor loss. By differentiation,
we write the gradient for a mini-batch S ′ as:
∇`S′(θ) ≈ 1
s′
∑
i∈S′
(
1
4
θ>xi − 1
2
yi
)
xi. (8)
The second-order is a compromise between precision and computational overhead. From
(6), the third-order approximation equals the second, while fourth and fifth-orders are not fit for
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minimization since their images take negative values. Minimizing the sixth-order Taylor loss is
costly when working in the encrypted space, and some simple experiments are enough to show that
the higher degree terms do not provide significant performance gains.
Additionally, the expansion is around 0, which implies a rough approximation of the logistic
loss when |θ>xi|  0. Nevertheless, square losses are commonly used for classification [Nock and
Nielsen, 2009] and that is essentially what we have obtained. Experiments in Section 8 show that
features standardization suffices for good performance. The loss is pictured in Figure 4. The logistic
loss is bounded above by the Taylor loss at every point, so their values are not directly comparable
and in addition their minimizers will differ.
Applying the encrypted mask — The encrypted mask can be incorporated into (4) by multiplying
each term by [[mi]]. Combined with the Taylor loss, the masked gradient for a mini-batch S ′ is
[[∇`S′(θ)]] ≈ 1
s′
∑
i∈S′
[[mi]]
(
1
4
θ>xi − 1
2
yi
)
xi, (9)
and the masked logistic loss on H is
[[`H(θ)]] ≈ [[ν]]− 1
2
θ>[[µ]] +
1
8h
∑
i∈H
[[mi]](θ
>xi)2, (10)
where [[ν]] = ((log 2)/h)
∑
i∈H [[mi]] and [[µ]] = (1/h)
∑
i∈H [[mi]]yixi. The constant term [[ν]] is
irrelevant for minimization since it is model-independent; henceforth we set it to 0.
6 Secure federated logistic regression
We detail now the second phase of our pipeline which amounts to run the federated logistic regression
with SGD. We assume that the entity resolution protocol has been run, thus A and B have permuted
their datasets accordingly, which now have the same number of rows n. The complete dataset is a
matrix X ∈ Rn×d. This matrix does not exist in one place but is composed of the columns of the
datasets A and B held respectively by A and B; this gives the vertical partition:
X =
[
XA XB
]
(11)
as seen in Figure 3. A also holds the label vector y. Let x be a row of X. Define xA to be the
restriction of x to the columns of A, and similarly for θ in place of x and B in place of A. Then we
can decompose θ>x as:
θ>x = θ>AxA + θ
>
BxB. (12)
Algorithm 2 computes the secure logistic regression and it is executed by C. It is a standard
SGD where computations involving raw data are replaced with their secure variants. We describe
computation of gradients in this section, while we defer to Appendix III for the initialization and
the loss evaluation for stopping criterion.
Prior to learning, C generates a key pair for the chosen cryptosystem and shares the public key
with A and B. Then, C sends the encrypted mask [[m]] to A and B. This allows the implementation of
a protocol where C is oblivious to the hold-out split and the mini-batch sampling of the training set.
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Algorithm 2: Secure logistic regression (run by C)
Data: Mask m, learning rate η, regularisation Γ, hold-out size h, batch size s′
Result: Model θ
create an additively homomorphic encryption key pair
send the public key to A and B
encrypt m with the public key, send [[m]] to A and B
run Algorithm 4 (h)
θ ← 0, `H ←∞
repeat
for every mini-batch S ′ do
∇`S′(θ)← Algorithm 3 (θ, t)
θ ← θ − η (∇`S′(θ) + Γθ);
`H(θ)← Algorithm 5 (θ)
if `H(θ) has not decreased for a while then break
until max iterations
return θ
Algorithm 4 initializes the protocol. A common hold-out H is sampled by A and B. Additionally,
they compute and cache [[µ]] in the logistic loss (10) computed on the hold-out.
Data has already been shuffled by the permutations result of entity matching (Section 4), hence
we can access it by mini-batches sequentially. Any stochastic gradient algorithm can be used for
optimisation. We choose SAG [Schmidt et al., 2013] for our experiments in Section 8; in this case,
C keeps the memory of the previous gradients.
Early stopping is applied by monitoring the Taylor loss on the hold-out H by Algorithm 5
(Appendix III.2). We prefer the computation of the loss over the hold-out error, which would be too
costly under any additively homomorphic encryption scheme.
Secure gradient — Algorithm 3 computes the secure gradient. It is called for every batch in Algo-
rithm 2 and hence is the computational bottleneck. We demonstrate the correctness of Algorithm 3
as follows. Fix an i ∈ S ′ and let x = (xA | xB) be the ith row of X. Note that the ith component
of [[mS′ ◦ u′]] is [[mi(14θ>AxA − 12yi)]], so the ith component of [[w]] is [[mi(14θ>x− 12yi)]] by (12).
Then
[[z]] = XBS′ [[w]] =
[[∑
i∈H
mixij(
1
4
θ>xi − 12yi)
]]
j
(13)
where j ranges over the columns of B (notation [uj]j is a vector notation whose coordinates are
defined by the set of values {uj}j); similarly A calculates the same for j ranging over columns of A
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Algorithm 3: Secure gradient
Data: Model θ, batch size s′
Result: ∇`S′(θ) of an (undisclosed) mini-batch S ′
C
send θ to A
A
select the next batch S ′ ⊂ S, |S ′| = s′
u = 1
4
XAS′θA
[[u′]] = [[m]]S′ ◦ (u− 12yS′)
send θ, S ′ and [[u′]] to B
B
v = 1
4
XBS′θB
[[w]] = [[u′]] + [[m]]S′ ◦ v
[[z]] = XBS′ [[w]]
send [[w]] and [[z]] to A
A
[[z′]] = XAS′ [[w]]
send [[z′]] and [[z]] to C
C
obtain [[∇`S′(θ)]] by concatenating [[z′]] and [[z]]
obtain ∇`S′(θ) by decrypting with the private key
to obtain [[z′]]. C concatenates these two and get [[∇`S′(θ)]] by (9). During Algorithm 3, the only
information sent in clear is about the model θ and the mini-batch S ′, both only shared between A
and B. All other messages are encrypted and C only receives ∇`S′(θ). Section IV in the Appendix
provides an additional security evaluation of our algorithms, including sources of potential leakage
of information.
7 Theoretical assessment of the learning component
As we work on encrypted data, the convergence rate of our algorithm is an important point; since
we consider entity resolution, it is crucial to investigate the impact of its errors on learning.
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7.1 Convergence
The former question is in fact already answered: although computations are performed in the
encrypted domain, the underlying arithmetic is equivalent and thus has no influence on the optimiza-
tion of the Taylor loss. Our implementation of SAG is done on a second-order Taylor loss which
is ridge regularized, so we have access to the strong convexity convergence [Schmidt et al., 2013,
Theorem 1]. Let S be a learning sample, assume we learn from S (not a holdout H or subset) and
let
`S(θ; γ,Γ) = `S(θ) + γθ
>Γθ (14)
denote the ridge regularized Taylor loss, with γ > 0, matrix Γ  0 (positive semi-definite) symmet-
ric, then we can expect convergence rates for `S(θ; γ,Γ)→ minθ′ `S(θ′; γ,Γ) at a rate approaching
ρk for some 0 < ρ < 1, k being the number of mini-batch updates in Algorithm 2.
7.2 Impact of entity resolution: parameters
This leaves us with the second problem, that of entity resolution, and in particular how wrong
matches can affect minθ `S(θ; γ,Γ). To the best of our knowledge, the state of the art on formal
analyses of how entity resolution affects learning is essentially a blank page, even in the vertical
partition setting where both parties have access to the same set of n entities — the case we study.
We let
θˆ∗ = arg min
θ
`S(θ; γ,Γ) ,
θ∗ = arg min
θ
`S∗(θ; γ,Γ) .
S∗ is the ideal dataset among all shared features, that is, reconstructed knowing the solution to entity
resolution between A and B. S denotes our dataset produced via (mistake-prone) entity resolution.
We shall deliver a number of results on how θˆ∗ and θ∗ are related, but first focus in this section on
defining and detailing the parameters and assumptions that will be key to obtaining our results.
7.2.1 Modelling entity resolution mistakes
In our setting, entity-resolution mistakes can be represented by permutation errors between A and B.
Precisely, there exists an unknown permutation matrix, P∗ : [n]→ [n], such that instead of learning
from the ideal X as in (11), we learn from some
Xˆ = [XA|(XB>P∗)>] . (15)
Without loss of generality, we assume that indices refer to columns in A and so permutation
errors impact the indices in B. We recall that A holds the labels as well. Several parameters and
assumptions will be key to our results. One such key parameter is the size T of P∗ when factored as
elementary permutations,
P∗ =
T∏
j=1
Pj (16)
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(T unknown), where Pt (unknown) acts on some index uA(t), vA(t) ∈ [n] in A. Such a factorization
always holds, and it is not hard to see that there always exist a factorization with T ≤ n.
Another key parameter is the number T+ ≤ T of class mismatch permutations in the factoriza-
tion, i.e. for which yuA(t) 6= yvA(t). We let
ρ
.
=
T+
T
(17)
define the proportion of elementary permutations that act between classes.
We let uB(t) (resp. vB(t)) denote the indices in [n] of the rows in XB that are in observation
uA(t) (resp. vA(t)) and that will be permuted by Pt. For example, if uB(t) = vA(t), vB(t) = uA(t),
then Pt correctly reconstructs observations uA(t) and vA(t).
7.2.2 Assumptions on permutations and data
We now proceed through our assumptions, that are covered in greater detail in the appendix, Section
V.3. We make two categories of assumptions:
• P∗ is bounded in magnitude and size,
• the data and learning problem parameters are accurately calibrated.
Bounding P∗ in terms of magnitude — This is what we define as (ε, τ)-accuracy. Denote xˆti
as row i in Xˆt, in which XB is altered by the subsequence
∏t
j=1 Pj , and xi as row i in X.
Definition 1 We say that Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate for some ε, τ ≥ 0, ε ≤ 1 iff for any w ∈ Rd,
|(xˆti − xi)>BwB| ≤ ε · |x>i w|+ τ‖w‖2 ,∀i ∈ [n] , (18)
|(xuF(t) − xvF(t))>FwF| ≤ ε · max
i∈{uF(t),vF(t)}
|x>i w|+ τ‖w‖2 ,∀F ∈ {A,B} . (19)
We say that P∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate iff each Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, ∀t = 1, 2, ..., T .
If we consider that vectors xˆti − xi,xuF(t) − xvF(t) quantify errors made by elementary permutation
Pt, then (ε, τ)-accuracy postulates that errors along any direction are bounded by a fraction of the
norm of original observations, plus a penalty that depends on the direction. We remark that in the
context of the inequalities, τ is homogeneous to a norm, which is not the case for ε (which can be
thought “unit-free”). For that reason, we define an important quantity that we shall use repeatedly,
aggregating ε and a “unit-free” τ :
ξ
.
= ε+
τ
X∗
, (20)
where X∗
.
= maxi ‖xi‖2 is the max norm in (the columns of) X. Section V.3 in the appendix gives
more context around Definition 1.
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Bounding P∗ in terms of size — The α-boundedness condition states that the decomposition in
eq. (16) has a number of terms limited as a function of n.
Definition 2 We say that P∗ is α-bounded for some 0 < α ≤ 1 iff its size satisfies
T ≤
(
n
ξ
) 1−α
2
. (21)
The bounded permutation size assumption roughly means that T = o(
√
n) in the worst case. “Worst
case” means that in favorable cases where we can fix ξ small, the assumption may be automatically
verified even for α very close to 1 since it always holds that a permutation can be decomposed in
elementary permutations with T ≤ n. Note that to achieve a particular level of (ε, τ)-accuracy
assumption, we may need more than the minimal factorisation, but it is more than reasonable to
assume that we shall still have T = O(n), which does not change the picture of the constraint
imposed by α-boundedness.
Data and model calibration — We denote σ(S) as the standard deviation of a set S, and λ↑1(Γ)
the smallest eigenvalue of Γ, following Bhatia [1997]. Finally, we define the stretch of a vector.
Definition 3 The stretch of vector x along direction w with ‖w‖2 = 1 is
$(x,w)
.
= ‖x‖2| cos(x,w)| . (22)
The stretch of x is just the norm of the orthogonal projection along direction w.
Definition 4 We say that the data-model calibration assumption holds iff the following two con-
straints are satisfied:
• Maxnorm-variance regularization: ridge regularization parameters γ,Γ are chosen so that
X2∗
(1−ε)2
8
· infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + γλ↑1(Γ)
≤ 1 . (23)
• Minimal data size: the dataset is not too small, namely,
n ≥ 4ξ . (24)
Remark that the data size roughly means that n is larger than a small constant, and the maxnorm-
variance regularization means that the regularization parameters have to be homogeneous to a
squared norm. Alternatively, having fixed the regularization parameters, we just need to recalibrate
data by normalizing observations to control X∗.
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Key parameters — We are now ready to deliver a series of results on various relationships
between θˆ∗ and θ∗: deviations between the classifiers, their empirical Ridge-regularized Taylor
losses, generalization abilities, etc. . Remarkably, all results depend on three distinct key parameters
that we now define.
Definition 5 We define δm, δρ, δµ as follows:
δm
.
= ‖θ∗‖2X∗, a bound on the maximum margin for the optimal (unknown) classifier3;
δρ
.
=
√
ξρ/4, aggregates parameters ε, τ, ρ of P∗;
δµ
.
= ‖∑i yixi‖2/(nX∗) (∈ [0, 1]), the normalized mean-operator4.
Notice that δm depends on the optimal classifier θ∗, δρ depends on the permutation matrix P∗, while
δµ depends on the true data S∗.
7.3 Relative error bounds for θˆ∗ vs θ∗
Our analysis gives the conditions on the unknown permutation, the learning problem and the data,
for the following inequality to hold:
‖θˆ∗ − θ∗‖2 ≤ a
n
· ‖θ∗‖2 + b
n
, (25)
where a and b are functions of relevant parameters. In other words, we display a parameter regime
in which a reasonably robust entity resolution will not significantly affect the optimal classifier.
We assume without loss of generality that ‖θ∗‖2 6= 0, a property guaranteed to hold if the mean
operator is not the null vector [Patrini et al., 2014].
Theorem 6 Suppose P∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate and the data-model calibration assumption holds. Then
the following holds:
‖θˆ∗ − θ∗‖2
‖θ∗‖2 ≤
ξ
n
· T 2 ·
(
1 +
√
ξ
4‖θ∗‖2X∗ · ρ
)
. (26)
If, furthermore, P∗ is α-bounded, then we get
‖θˆ∗ − θ∗‖2
‖θ∗‖2 ≤ C(n) ·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
)
, (27)
with C(n) .= (ξ/n)α.
Function C(n) is going to have key roles in the results to follow. It will be useful to keep in mind
that, as long as we can sample and link more data by keeping a finite upperbound on ξ, we shall
observe:
C(n) →+∞ 0 ,∀α ∈ (0, 1] . (28)
3Follows from Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
4A sufficient statistics for the class [Patrini et al., 2014].
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The proof of Theorem 6 is quite long and detailed in Sections V.1 – V.4 of the appendix. It uses
a helper theorem which we think is of independent interest for the study of entity resolution in a
learning setting. Informally, it is an exact expression for θˆ∗ − θ∗ which holds regardless of P∗. We
anticipate that this result may be interesting to optimize entity resolution in the context of learning.
Theorem 6 essentially shows that ‖θˆ∗ − θ∗‖2/‖θ∗‖2 →n 0 and is all the faster to converge as
"classification gain beats permutation penalty" (δm/δρ large). Ultimately, we see that learning can
withstand bigger permutations (α ↘), provided it is accompanied by a sufficient decrease in the
proportion of of elementary permutations that act between classes (ρ↘): efficient entity resolution
algorithms for federated learning should thus focus on trade-offs of this kind.
The key problem that remains is how does the drift θˆ∗−θ∗ impact learning. For that objective, we
start with two results with different flavours: first, an immunity of optimal large margin classification
to the errors of entity resolution, and second, a bound for the difference of the Taylor losses of
the optimal classifier (θ∗) and our classifier θˆ∗ on the true data, which shows strong convergence
properties for `S∗(θˆ∗; γ,Γ) towards `S∗(θ∗; γ,Γ).
7.4 Immunity of optimal large margin classification to P∗
We show that under the conditions of Theorem 6, large margin classification by the optimal classifier
(θ∗) is immune to the impact of P∗ on learning, in the sense that the related examples will be given
the same class by θˆ∗ — the corresponding margin, however, may vary. We formalize the definition
now.
Definition 7 Fix κ > 0. We say that θˆ∗ is immune to P∗ at margin κ iff for any example (x, y), if
y(θ∗)>x > κ, then y(θˆ∗)>x > 0.
We can now formalize the immunity property.
Theorem 8 Suppose P∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate and α-bounded, and the data-model calibration assump-
tion holds. For any κ > 0, θˆ∗ is immune to P∗ at margin κ if
n > ξ ·
(
δm + δρ
κ
) 1
α
. (29)
(proof in Appendix, Section V.5) Eq. (29) is interesting for the relationships between n (data), ξ
(permutation) and κ (margin) to achieve immunity. Consider a permutation P∗ for which ρ = 0,
that is, P∗ factorizes as cycles that act within one class each. Since the maximal optimal margin
within S is bounded by δm by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, so we can let κ
.
= δ · δm where 0 < δ < 1
is the margin immunity parameter. In this case, (29) simplifies to the following constraint on δ to
satisfy immunity at margin κ:
δ > C(n) , (30)
where C(n) is defined in Theorem 6. Roughly, increasing the domain size (n) without degrading
the effects of P∗ (ξ) can allow to significantly reduce the minimal immune margin.
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7.5 Bound on the difference of Taylor losses for θ∗ vs θˆ∗ on the true data
We essentially show that under the assumptions of Theorem 8, it holds that `S∗(θˆ∗; γ,Γ) −
`S∗(θ
∗; γ,Γ) = o(1), and the convergence is governed by C(n). By means of words, the loss
of our classifier (built over entity-resolved data) on the true data converges to that of the optimal
classifier at a rate roughly proportional to 1/nα.
Theorem 9 Suppose P∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate and α-bounded, and the data-model calibration assump-
tion holds. Then it holds that:
`S∗(θˆ
∗; γ,Γ)− `S∗(θ∗; γ,Γ) ≤ δm,ρ
(
δµ + 6δm,ρ
) · C(n) , (31)
where δm,ρ
.
= (δm + δρ)/2 and C(n) is defined in Theorem 6.
(proof in Appendix, Section V.6) We remark the difference with Theorem 8 that the bound also
depends on a normalized sufficient statistics for the class of the true data (δµ).
7.6 Generalization abilities for classifiers learned from E/R’ed data
Suppose that ideal sample S∗ is obtained i.i.d. from some unknown distribution D, before it
is "split" between A and B, and then reconstructed to form our training sample S. What is the
generalization ability of classifier θˆ∗ ? This question is non-trivial because it entails the impact of
entity resolution (E/R) on generalization, and not just on training, that is, we want to upperbound
Pr(x,y)∼D[y(θˆ∗)>x ≤ 0] with high probability given that the data we have access to may not exactly
reflect sampling from D. The following Theorem provides such a bound.
Theorem 10 With probability at least 1 − δ over the sampling of S∗ according to Dn, if the
permutation P∗ that links S and S∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate and α-bounded and the data-model calibration
assumption holds, then it holds that
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[
y(θˆ∗)>x ≤ 0
]
≤ `S∗(θ∗; γ,Γ) + 2LX∗θ∗√
n
+
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
+ U(n) , (32)
with L the Lipschitz constant of the Ridge-regularized Taylor loss, θ∗ an upperbound on ‖θ∗‖2 and
U(n)
.
= δm,ρ ·
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ + (4L/
√
n)
) · C(n) . (33)
δm,ρ is defined in Theorem 9 and C(n) is defined in Theorem 6.
(proof in Appendix, Section V.7) What is quite remarkable with that property is that we immediately
have with probability at least 1− δ, from Bartlett and Mendelson [2002]:
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[
y(θ∗)>x ≤ 0] ≤ `S∗(θ∗; γ,Γ) + 2LX∗θ∗√
n
+
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
, (34)
i.e. the corresponding inequality in which we remove U(n) in eq. (32) actually holds for substituting
θˆ∗ by θ∗ in the left hand side. In short, entity resolution affects generalization only through penalty
U(n). In addition, if P∗ is "small" enough so that α ≥ 1/2, then we keep the slow-rate convergence
(O(1/
√
n)) of the E/R-free case. Otherwise, entity-resolution may impact generalization by slowing
down this convergence.
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(a) loss convergence (b) runtime for entity match-
ing
(c) runtime for a learning
epoch
(d) runtime for a learning
epoch
Figure 5: (a) Learning curve for Taylor vs. logistic loss (straight lines) and their test error (dotted);
(b) runtime of entity matching with respect to the size of the two datasets; runtime of one learning
epoch (all mini-batches + hold-out loss evaluation) with respect to number of examples (c) and
features (d).
8 Experiments
We test our system experimentally and show that: i) the Taylor loss converges at a similar rate to
the logistic loss in practice; ii) their accuracy is comparable at test time; iii) privacy-preserving
entity resolution scales to the tens of millions of rows per data provider in a matter of hours; iv)
federated logistic regression scales to millions of rows in the order of hours per epoch; v) the
end-to-end system shows learning performance on par with learning on the perfectly linked datasets,
the non-private setting.
Taylor vs. logistic — We have sketched the convergence rate of the Taylor loss in Section
7. Here we are interested in its experimental behaviour; see Figure 5(a). We run vanilla SGD
on MNIST (odd vs. even digits) with constant learning rate η = 0.05 and Γ = 10−2I ridge
regularization. The Taylor loss shows a very similar rate of convergence to the logistic loss. In
both cases, features are standardized. Notice that the two losses converge to different minima and
minimizers. What is important is to verify that at test time the two minimizers result in similar
accuracy, which is indeed the case in Figure 5(a). In Table 2 we show that this is no coincidence.
For several UCI datasets [Bache and Lichman, 2013], we standardize features and run SGD with
the same hyper-parameters as above. Quantitative performance (accuracy and AUC) of the two
losses differ by at most 1.8 points.
Scalability — For the rest of this Section, empirical results will be based on a “quasi-real
scenario”, an augmented version of Kaggle [2011]’s Give me some credit dataset. The original
problem involves classifying whether a customer will default on a loan. We call this benchmark
dataset PACS (PI Augmented Credit Scoring): realistic PIs, potentially missing and with typos, are
generated for the entities by Febrl [Christen, 2008]. The data is then split vertically in two halves of
the 12 original features. The size of the dataset is about 160K examples.
In order to test the scalability of each component of our pipeline, we upsample the dataset and
augment the feature sets by feature products, and record the runtime of our implementations of
entity resolution and logistic regression solve by SAG. For these experiments we run each party of
the protocol on a separate AWS machine with 16 cores and 60GiB of memory. We use the Paillier
encryption scheme as our additively homomorphic scheme with a key size of 1024 bits, from the
implementation of python-paillier [2017].
First, for benchmarking the entity resolution algorithm, we make a grid of datasets with sizes
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logistic Taylor (delta)
dataset #rows #feat. acc AUC acc AUC
iris 100 3 98.0 100 +0.0 +0.0
diabetes 400 10 69.0 79.3 +0.0 +0.5
bostonhousing 400 13 76.4 98.2 +0.0 +0.1
breastcancer 400 30 94.7 98.4 +1.7 +0.3
digits 1.5K 64 92.3 97.0 +1.0 +0.4
simulated 8K 100 68.8 76.0 -0.1 +0.0
mnist 60K 784 89.2 95.8 +0.1 -0.1
20newsgroups 10K 5K 51.7 66.8 -0.2 -1.8
covertype 500K 54 72.2 79.1 -0.1 +0.1
Table 2: Taylor vs. logistic loss on UCI datasets. When the original problem is multi-class or
regression, we cast it into binary classification.
spanning on a log-scale from 1K to 10M . The entity matching only acts on the PI attributes. In
Figure 5(b) we measure the runtime of the combined construction of CLKs, network communication
to C and matching two datasets. The coordinating party uses a cluster of 8 machines for maching.
As expected, entity resolution scales quadratically in the number of rows, due to the number of
comparisons that are needed for brute-force matching. Due to the embarrassingly parallel workload
the C component can handle matches with datasets up to 10M rows in size in a matter of hours.
Second, we measured the runtime of learning. We generated multiple versions of the dataset
varying the number of rows and features; while rows are simply copied multiple times, we create
new features by multiplying the original ones. We are not interested in convergence time here but
only on a scalability measure on an epoch basis; the recorded runtime accounts for updating the
model for all mini-batches and one hold-out loss computation. See Figures 5(c) and 5(d). Runtime
grows linearly in both scales. This is the bottleneck of the whole system, due to the expensive
encrypted operations and the communication of large encrypted numbers between the parties. We
estimated that encryption amounts to a slow down of about two orders of magnitude.
The communication costs of one epoch consists of
cost∇ ≤ (2n+ 2dn/s′ed)ct
cost` = (hs + 2)ct
where ct describes the size of one cipher text. Thus, for s′ = d = 100, n = 1 M and a cipher text
size of 256 bytes, the overall communication costs for one epoch a just under 1 GB.
Benchmark — Finally, we test the whole system on three version of PACS, where we control
the percent of shared entities between A and B, in the range of {100, 66, 33}%. The same test set is
used for evaluating performance; labels in the test set are unbalanced (93/7%) while the training set
is artificially balanced. Table 3 shows our system performs exactly on par with logistic regression
run on perfectly linked datasets (the non-private setting), with respect to accuracy, AUC and f1-score.
We also record the percent for wrongly linked entities by our entity matching algorithm: around 1%
of the entities is linked as a mistake. The main take-away message is that those mistakes are not
detrimental for learning; hence, we support the claim of Theorem 6 on a practical ground. (Notice
also how the fraction of shared entities does not seem to matter, arguably due to the fact that we
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logistic regression our (delta) matching
dataset acc AUC f1 acc AUC f1 errors (%)
PACS-33 88.5 80.4 36.9 +0.1 +0.0 +0.1 1.0
PACS-66 88.6 80.3 36.9 -0.1 +0.0 +0.1 0.9
PACS-100 88.6 80.3 37.2 +0.1 -0.0 +0.0 0.8
Table 3: Our system vs. logistic regression on perfectly linked data on PACS. We also record the
percent of wrong matches by our entity resolution algorithm.
learn a low dimensional linear model which cannot capitalize the large training set.)
9 Conclusion
We have shown how to learn a linear classifier in a privacy-preserving federated fashion when data
is vertically partitioned. We addressed the problem end-to-end, by pipelining entity resolution
and distributed logistic regression by using Paillier encryption. All records, including identifiers
required for linkage and the linkage map itself, remain confidential from other parties. To the best
of our knowledge, our system is the first scalable and accurate solution to this problem. Importantly,
we do not introduce extrinsic noise for gaining privacy, which would hinder predictive performance;
differential privacy could, however, be applied on top of our protocol when the model itself is
deemed susceptible to malicious attacks. On the theory side, we provide the first analysis of the
impact of entity resolution on learning, with a potential for further use for the design of entity
matching methods specifically targeted to learning. Our results show that the picture of learning
is not changed under reasonable assumptions on the magnitude and size of mistakes due to entity
resolution — even rates for generalization can remain of the same order. More: errors introduced
during entity resolution do not impact the examples with large margin classification by the optimal
(unknown) classifier: they are given the same class by our classifier as well. Since federated learning
can dramatically improve the accuracy of this optimal classifier (because it is built over a potentially
much larger set of features), the message this observation carries is that it can be extremely beneficial
to carry out federated learning in the setting where each peer’s data provides a significant uplift
to the other. Our results signal the existence of non-trivial tradeoffs for entity-resolution to be
optimized with the objective of learning from linked data. We hope such results will contribute to
spur related research in the active and broad field fo entity resolution.
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I Paillier encryption scheme
We describe in more detail the Paillier encryption scheme Paillier [1999], an asymmetric additively
homomorphic encryption scheme. In what follows, Zt will denote the ring of integers {0, 1, ..., t−1},
with addition and multiplication performed modulo the positive integer t, and Z∗t will denote the set
of invertible elements of Zt (equivalently, elements that do not have a common divisor with t).
In the Paillier system the private key is a pair of randomly selected large prime numbers p and q,
and the public key is their product m = pq. The plaintext space is the set Zm, the ciphertext space
is Z∗m2 , and the encryption of an element x ∈ Zm is given by:
x 7→ gxrmx (35)
where g is a generator of Z∗m2 (which can be taken to be m + 1) and rx is an element of Z
∗
m
selected uniformly at random (the subscript x is to indicate that a new value should be selected for
every input). Note that any rx produces a valid ciphertext, so in particular many valid ciphertexts
correspond to a given plaintext. Let the encryption of a number x be [[x]]. It follows immediately
from (35) that, for elements x, y ∈ Zm,
[[x]][[y]] = gx+y(rxry)
m = [[x+ y]] , (36)
whence we define the operator ‘⊕’ by [[x]]⊕ [[y]] = [[x+ y]]. (In Section I we denoted this operator
simply as ’+’.) Then, by linearity,
y⊕
i=1
[[x]] =
[ y∑
i=1
x
]
= [[xy]]. (37)
Note that in this latter case, y is not encrypted. Suppose a party is sent [[x]] and computes [[xy]] from
[[x]] and y using (37). If the party who originally computed [[x]] subsequently obtains [[xy]], then they
can verify whether a guess y′ for y is correct by calculating
⊕y′
i=1[[x]] and comparing it with [[xy]].
In general recovering y here is equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem, but if y is known to
come from a small set then this becomes simple to solve. We can protect y when “multiplying by y”
by adding [[0]], forcing the random multiplier r to change. Hence we define multiplication by:
[[x]]y = [[xy]]⊕ [[0]]. (38)
It is worth reiterating that all operations that occur inside the [[ · ]] occur in the plaintext space
Zm, hence modulo the public key m, while all operations that occur outside the [[ · ]] occur in the
ciphertext space Zm2 , hence modulo m2.
For a vector x = (xi)i, the notation [[x]] should be interpreted component-wise, that is
[[x]] =
(
[[xi]]
)
i
. We also extend the definition of ⊕ to operate component-wise on vectors, and
of multiplication to perform scalar multiplication: s[[x]] = [[sx]] = [[s]]x. Additionally, we define:
[[x]] ◦ y = ([[xi]]yi)i = [[x ◦ y]] (39)
to be the component-wise (or “Hadamard”) product with a plaintext vector and:
[[x]] y =
⊕
i
[[xi]]yi = [[x
>y]] (40)
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to be the “dot product” of an encrypted vector with a plaintext vector. (In Section I we omitted the
symbol for this operator, as it would for a standard product.) We can also extend the definition of ‘’
to express matrix multiplication: For matrices A and B with compatible dimensions,
[[AB]] = A[[B]] (41)
=
(
Ai  [[Bj]]
)
i,j
=
(
[[Ai]]Bj
)
i,j
= [[A]]B
is the usual product of two matrices. In particular, for a vector x, we can compute: [[Ax]] = [[A]]x =
A[[x]] or [[xA]] = [[x]]A = x[[A]] depending on when the dimensions are compatible.
There is, of course, a decryption process corresponding to the encryption process of (35), but
the details are out of scope here. Suffice it to say that, computationally speaking, the cost of a
decryption is in the order of a single modular exponentiation modulo m.
II Encoding
The Paillier cryptosystem only provides arithmetic for elements of Zm. We give details on our
encoding of floating-point numbers.
Fix an integer β > 1, which will serve as a base, and let q be any fraction. Any pair of integers
(s, e) satisfying q = sβe is called a base-β exponential representation of q. The values s and e
are called the significand and exponent respectively. Let q = (s, e) and r = (t, f) be the base-β
exponential representations of two fractions and without loss of generality assume that f ≥ e. Then
(s + tβf−e, e) is a representation of q + r which follows by using the equivalent representation
(tβf−e, e) for (t, f). A representation for qr is simply given by (st, e+ f).
In order to be compatible with the Paillier encryption system we will require the significand
s to satisfy 0 ≤ s < m where m is the public key. This limits the precision of the encoding to
log2m bits, which is not a significant impediment as a reasonable choice of m is at least 1024 bits
[BlueKrypt, 2017]. Let:
q = σϕ2ε, (42)
be a unbiased IEEE 754 floating-point number, where
σ = ±1, ϕ = 1 +
d∑
i=1
bd−i2−i, (43)
and bj ∈ {0, 1} for all j = 0, . . . , d− 1; for single precision d = 23 and −127 < ε < 128, while
for double precision d = 52 and −1023 < ε < 1024. (We do not treat subnormal numbers, so
we can treat ε = 0 specially as representing q = 0.) An encoding of q relative to a Paillier key m
is a base-β exponential representation computed as follows. If q = 0, set s = e = 0. Otherwise,
let e = b(ε − d + 1) logβ 2c and s′ = ϕβ−e; one can verify that this choice of e is the smallest
such that s′ ≥ 1. Finally, set s = s′ if σ = 1 and s = m − s′ if σ = −1. Then (s, e) is a base-β
exponential representation for q with 0 ≤ s < m/2 when q ≥ 0 and m/2 ≤ s < m when q < 0.
This consciously mimics the familiar two’s compliment encoding of integers. The advantage of this
encoding (over, say, a fixed-point encoding scheme) is that we can encode a very large range of
values.
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Since the significand must be less thanm, it can happen that the sum or product of two encodings
is too big to represent correctly and overflow occurs. Specifically, for a fraction q = (s, e), if
|q|/βe ≥ m/2 then overflow occurs. In practice we start with fractions with 53 bits of precision
(for a double precision IEEE 754 float) and the Paillier public key m allows for log2(m/2) = 1023
bits of precision so we can accumulate b1023/53c = 19 multiplications by 53-bit numbers before
overflow might happen. Overflow cannot be detected in the scheme described here. One partial
solution to detecting overflow is to reserve an interval between the positive and negative regions and
to consider a number to have overflowed if its value is in that region. This method does not detect
numbers that overflow beyond the reserved interval, and has the additional drawback of reducing
the available range of encoded numbers.
We define the encryption of an encoded number q = (s, e) to be [[q]] =
(
[[s]], e
)
. Note in
particular that we encrypt the significand but we do not encrypt the exponent, so some information
about the order of magnitude of an encrypted number is public. There are protocols that calculate the
maximum of two encrypted numbers (see, for example, [Damgård et al., 2008]) which could be used
to calculate the maximum of encrypted exponents (needed during addition as seen above). However
it would be prohibitively expensive to compute this maximum for every arithmetic operation, so
instead we leave the exponents public and leak the order of magnitude of each number.
To see more precisely how much information is leaked, consider an encrypted number [[q]] =
([[s]], e) encoded with respect to the base β. The exponent satisfies e = b(ε− d+ 1) logβ 2c (with
d = 23 or 52 as above), hence:
c ≤ ε < c+ log2 β (44)
where c = e log2 β + d− 1 is public information. Thus the original exponent ε is known to be in a
range of length log2 β, and hence we learn that:
2c ≤ q < 2cβ, (45)
that is, q is within a factor of β of 2c. (Note that e = 0 includes the special case of q = 0.) The
extent of the leakage can be mitigated in several ways, for example by choosing a large enough base
so that no significant detail can be recovered, or by fixing the exponent for all encoded numbers as
in fixed-point encodings.
Using the arithmetic of encoded numbers defined above, and assuming f ≥ e, we can extend
the definitions of ‘⊕’ and multiplication by:
([[s]], e)⊕ ([[t]], f) = ([[s]]⊕ [[t]]βf−e, e) (46)
and
([[s]], e)(t, f) = ([[s]]t, e+ f). (47)
Note that the definition of ‘⊕’ in (46) has the unfortunate consequence of requiring a multiplication
of [[t]] whenever f 6= e. It is clear that addition does not change the leakage range (it is still β), while
multiplication increases the range to β2, mitigating the leakage by a factor of β.
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Algorithm 4: Secure loss initialization
Data: Hold-out size h
Result: Caching of [[µ]] of the (undisclosed) hold-out H
C
send h to A
A
sample the hold-out row H ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |H| = h
[[m ◦ y]]H ← [[m]]H ◦ yH
[[u]]← 1
h
[[m ◦ y]]>H XAH
send H , [[u]] and [[m ◦ y]]H to B
B
[[v]]← 1
h
[[m ◦ y]]>H BH
obtain [[µH ]] by concatenating [[u]] and [[v]]
III Secure initialization and loss computation
III.1 Secure loss initialization
Algorithm 4 performs the secure loss initialization evaluation. Since µH is independent from θ, we
can cache for future computation of the logistic loss. To see why Algorithm 4 is correct, note that:
[[u]] = 1
h
[[m ◦ y]]>HXAH = 1h
[
(m ◦ y)>HXAH
]
. (48)
Similarly, [[v]] = 1
h
[[(m ◦ y)>HXBH ]], and so, after concatenating, B obtains [[µH ]] = 1h
[
(m ◦ y)>HXH
]
.
B only receives the encrypted forms of (m ◦ y)H and 1h(m ◦ y)>HXAH from A and only holds the
final result [[µH ]] in encrypted form which is not sent to the C .
III.2 Secure logistic loss
Algorithm 5 computes the secure logistic loss. It is called in Algorithm 2, once per iteration of the
outer loop.
To show the correctness of Algorithm 5 first note that, for i ∈ H , the ith component of [[mH ◦ u]]
is [[miθ>AxiA]] and u
′ = 1
8h
∑
imi(θ
>
AxiA)
2; similarly for v and v′ mutatis mutandis. Hence
w0 = u
′ + v′ + 1
4h
(
(mH ◦ u)>v
)
= 1
8h
∑
i∈H
mi(θ
>xi)2 , (49)
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Algorithm 5: Secure logistic loss
Data: Model θ, requires [[µH ]] and H cached by Algorithm 4
Result: `H(θ) of the (undisclosed) hold-out
C
send θ to A
A
u← XAHθA
[[mH ◦ u]]← [[m]]H ◦ u
[[u′]]← 1
8h
(u ◦ u)>[[m]]
send θ, [[mH ◦ u]] and [[u′]] to B
B
v = XBHθB
[[v′]]← 1
8h
(v ◦ v)>[[m]]H
[[w]]← [[u′]] + [[v′]] + 1
4h
v>[[mH ◦ u]]
[[`H(θ)]]← [[w]]− 14hθ>[[µH ]]
send [[`H(θ)]] to C
C
obtain `H(θ) by decryption with the private key
since
(θ>xi)2 = (θ>AxiA)
2 + (θ>BxiB)
2 + 2(θ>AxiA)(θ
>
BxiB) (50)
for every row x of X by (12). Then w = w0 − 14θ>µH ≈ `(θ) by (10), which can be computed
since [[µH ]] was previously computed by B in Algorithm 4.
C only sees the final result `H(θ). A and B see the model θ, and B receives only the encrypted
forms of the values miθ>AxA and
∑
imi(θ
>
AxA)
2 (for i ∈ H) from A.
IV Security evaluation
It is important to clarify how the data is distributed and what is visible to the three parties. Table A4
gives a summary of which values each party will see during an execution of Algorithm 2. Most
entries will be obvious, with the possible exception of the column for ∇`′S(θ). The values for
∇`′S(θ) can be derived from the successive values of θ, which are seen by all parties. If θ and θ′
are successive values of the weight vector, then∇`′S(θ) = η−1(θ− θ′)− γθ from line 2; the values
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agent A B m n θ H S S′ µH `H ∇`′S
A X X X X X X X
B X X X X X X X
C X X X X X
Table A4: Summary of data visibility for each agent.
of η and γ are not private. Notice how µH is known by nobody, and it is accessible by B only in
encrypted form.
Different protection mechanisms are in place to secure the communication and protect against
information leakage among the three parties.
The matched entities are protected from A and B by the implementation of a private entity
matching algorithm which creates a random permutation for A and for B, and a mask received only
by C. During the private entity matching algorithm, the information from A and B are protected
from C by the construction of the CLKs.
Additively homomorphic encryption protects the values in A’s data from B, and vice-versa.
This does not hold for C, who owns the private key. Protection from C is achieved by sending only
computed values which are not considered private (such as the gradient which is shared with all
participants).
We finally note that, while the data is protected via different mechanisms, our work does not
protect against the leakage of information through the model and its iterative computation.
Potential leakage of information — We analyze two sources of leakage:
• Number of matches in a mini batch: After the entity resolution, the data providers only
receive an encrypted mask and a permutation. They do not learn the total number of matches
between them. Thus, when the first data provider chooses the mini batches at random, the
number of matches in each of the batches is unknown. However, this can lead to a potential
leak of information, as the corresponding gradient will be revealed in the clear. If, for
instance, this gradient is zero, then both data provider know, that they do not have any entities
in common within this mini batch. Or a mini batch only contains one match, then the gradient
reveals the corresponding label. This kind of leakage can be mitigated by carefully choosing
the batch size. Let X be a random variable describing the number of matches in a mini batch,
then X follows the hypergeometric distribution. Let CDFhyper(N,K, n, k) be its cumulative
density function with N is the population size, K is the number of success states in the
population, n is the number of draws, and k is the number of observed successes. Then the
probability that a mini batch contains not more than k matches is:
P [X ≤ k] = CDFhyper(n,M, s′, k).
M stands of the total number of matches. Note that the coordinator has all the necessary
information available, and could therefore test if the probability for the chosen parameters is
acceptably low or otherwise abort the protocol.
• Public exponent in encoding of encrypted numbers: The floating point inspired encoding
scheme for encrypted numbers leaks information about the plaintext through a public exponent.
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We quantify the leakage in Appendix II and want to point out that the leakage can be reduced
by increasing the value for the base. However we do admit that this form of leakage is
unnecessary, as we are confident that the algorithm will also work with a fixed-point encoding
scheme. We plan to address this issue in a future version.
V Proofs
V.1 Notations
The proofs being quite heavy in notations, we define two new notations (on the observation matrix
and training sample) that will be more convenient than in the main file.
(observation matrix) the observation matrix is now transposed — it has observations in
columns. Thus, instead of writing as in eq. (11) (main file):
X =
[
XA XB
]
, (51)
We let from now on, with a matrix notation,
X
.
=
[
XA
XB
]
(52)
denote a block partition of X, where XA ∈ RdA×m and XB ∈ RdB×m (so, XA = XA>, XB =
XB
>).
(training and ideal sample) Instead of S∗ to denote the ideal sample, we let S denote the
ideal sample, and the training sample we have access to (produced via error-prone entity
resolution) is now Sˆ instead of S.
We do not observe X but rather an estimate through approximately accurate linkage,
Xˆ
.
=
[
XA
XˆB
]
, (53)
where
XˆB
.
= XBP∗ , (54)
where P∗ ∈ {0, 1}n×n is a permutation matrix. To refer to the features of A and B with words we
shall call them the anchor (A) and shuffle (B) feature spaces.
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Any permutation matrix can be factored as a product of elementary permutation matrices. So
suppose that
P∗ =
T∏
t=1
Pt , (55)
where Pt is an elementary permutation matrix, where T < n is unknown. Xˆ can be progressively
constructed from a sequence Xˆ0, Xˆ1, ..., XˆT where Xˆ0 = X and for t ≥ 1,
Xˆt
.
=
[
XA
XˆtB
]
, XˆtB
.
= XB
t∏
j=1
Pj . (56)
We recall that by convention, permutations act on the shuffle set B of features, and labels are
associated with A and therefore are not affected by the permutation (without loss of generality). Let
Xˆt
.
= [xˆt1 xˆt2 · · · xˆtn] , (57)
denote the column vector decomposition of Xˆt (with xˆ0i
.
= xi) and let Sˆt be the training sample
obtained from the t first permutations in the sequence (Sˆ0
.
= S). Hence, Sˆt
.
= {(xˆti, yi), i =
1, 2, ..., n}.
Definition K The mean operator associated to Sˆt is Rd 3 µt .= µ(Sˆt) .=
∑
i yi · xˆti.
The mean operator is a sufficient statistics for the class in linear models [Patrini et al., 2014]. We can
make at this point a remark that is going to be crucial in our results, and obvious from its definition:
the mean operator is invariant to permutations made within classes, i.e. µT = µ0 if P∗ factorizes as
two permutations, one affecting the positive class only, and the other one affecting the negative class
only. Since the optimal classifier for the Taylor loss is a linear mapping of the mean operator, we see
that the drift in its optimal classifier due to permutations will be due only to mistakes in the linear
mapping when P∗ factorizes in such a convenient way. Now, consider elementary permutation Pt.
We call pairs for Pt the two column indexes affected by Pt. Namely,
(a) we denote uA(t) and vA(t) the two column indexes of the observations in X affected by
elementary permutation Pt;
(b) we denote uB(t) and vB(t) the two column indexes of the observations in X such that after Pt,
the shuffle part of column uA(t) (resp. vA(t)) is the shuffle part of xuB(t) (resp. xvB(t)).
To summarize (b), we have the following Lemma.
Lemma L The following holds for any t ≥ 1:
(xˆtuA(t))B = (xuB(t))B , (58)
(xˆtvA(t))B = (xvB(t))B . (59)
Figure 6 shows an example of our notations.
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Xˆt 1
B
A
uA(t) vA(t)
vB(t)
uB(t)
B
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Xˆt
Pt
Figure 6: Permutation Pt applied to observation matrix Xˆt−1 and subsequent matrix Xˆt, using
notations uA(t), uB(t), vA(t) and vB(t). Anchor textures denote references for the textures in B
(best viewed in color).
Example M Denote for short {0, 1}n×n 3 Θu,v .= 1u1>v +1v1>u −1v1>v −1u1>u (symmetric) such
that 1u is the uth canonical basis vector of Rn. For t = 1, it follows
uB(1) = vA(1) , (60)
vB(1) = uA(1) . (61)
Thus, it follows:
XAΘuA(1),vA(1)Xˆ
>
1B
= (xuA(1))A(x1vA(1))
>
B + (xvA(1))A(x1uA(1))
>
B − (xvA(1))A(x1vA(1))>B − (xuA(1))A(x1uA(1))>B
= (xuA(1))A(xvB(1))
>
B + (xvA(1))A(xuB(1))
>
B − (xvA(1))A(xvB(1))>B − (xuA(1))A(xuB(1))>B (62)
= (xuA(1))A(xuA(1))
>
B + (xvA(1))A(xvA(1))
>
B − (xvA(1))A(xuA(1))>B − (xuA(1))A(xvA(1))>B (63)
= (xuA(1) − xvA(1))A(xuA(1) − xvA(1))>B . (64)
In eq. (62), we have used eqs (58, 59) and in eq. (63), we have used eqs (60, 61).
Key matrices — The proof of our main helper Theorem is relatively heavy in linear algebra
notations: for example, it involves T double applications of Sherman-Morrison’s inversion Lemma.
We now define a series of matrices and vectors that will be most useful to simplify notations and
proofs. Letting b .= 8nγ (where γ is the parameter of the Ridge regularization in our Taylor loss,
see Lemma N below), we first define the matrix we will use most often:
Vt
.
=
(
XˆtXˆ
>
t + b · Γ
)−1
, t = 0, 1, ..., T , (65)
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where Γ is the Ridge regularization parameter matrix in our Taylor loss, see Lemma N below.
Another matrix Ut, quantifies precisely the local mistake made by each elementary permutation. To
define it, we first let (for t = 1, 2, ..., T ):
at
.
= (xuA(t) − xvA(t))A , (66)
bt
.
= (xuB(t) − xvB(t))B . (67)
Also, let (for t = 1, 2, ..., T )
a+t
.
=
[
(xuA(t) − xvA(t))A
0
]
∈ Rd , (68)
b+t
.
=
[
0
(xuB(t) − xvB(t))B
]
∈ Rd , (69)
and finally (for t = 1, 2, ..., T ),
c0,t
.
= a+t
>
Vt−1a+t , (70)
c1,t
.
= a+t
>
Vt−1b+t , (71)
c2,t
.
= b+t
>
Vt−1b+t . (72)
We now define Ut as the following block matrix:
Ut
.
=
1
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ·
[
c2,t · ata>t (1− c1,t) · atb>t
(1− c1,t) · bta>t c0,t · btb>t
]
, t = 1, 2, ..., T . (73)
Ut can be computed only when (1 − c1,t)2 6= c0,tc2,t. This shall be the subject of the invertibility
assumption below. Hereafter, we suppose without loss of generality that bt 6= 0, since otherwise
permutations would make no mistakes on the shuffle part.
There is one important thing to remark on Ut: it is defined from the indices uA(t) and vA(t) in A
that are affected by Pt. Hence, U1 collects the two first such indices (see Figure 6). We also define
matrix Λt as follows:
Λt
.
= 2VtUt+1 , t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 . (74)
To finishup with matrices, we define a doubly indexed matrices that shall be crucial to our proofs,
Hi,j for 0 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ T :
Hi,j
.
=
{ ∏i−1
k=j(Id + Λk) if 0 ≤ j < i
Id if j = i
. (75)
Key vectors — we let
εt
.
= µt+1 − µt , t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 , (76)
which is the difference between two successive mean operators, and
λt
.
= 2Vt+1εt , t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 . (77)
Figure 7 summarizes our key notations in this Section. We are now ready to proceed through the
proof of our key helper Theorem.
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Figure 7: Summary of our key notations on matrices and vectors, and dependencies. The dashed
arrow means indexes do not match (eq. (77)).
V.2 Helper Theorem
In this Section, we first show (Theorem P below) that under lightweight assumptions to ensure
the existence of Vt, the difference between two successive optimal classifiers in the progressive
computation of the overall permutation matrix that generates the errors is exactly given by:
θ∗t+1 − θ∗t = 2 · VtUt+1θ∗t + 2 · Vt+1εt
= Λtθ
∗
t + λt ,∀t ≥ 0 , (78)
where Λt, εt,λt are defined in eqs (76, 74, 77). This holds regardless of the permutation matrices in
the sequence.
We start by the trivial solutions to the minimization of the Taylor loss for all t = 1, 2, ..., T .
Lemma N Let
`S,γ(θ)
.
= log 2− 1
n
∑
i
{
1
2
· yiθ>xi − 1
8
· (θ>xi)2
}
+ γθ>Γθ (79)
denote the γ-Ridge regularized Taylor loss for set S on classifier θ. Then
θ∗(Sˆ) .= arg min
θ
`Sˆ,γ(θ)
= 2 ·
(
XˆXˆ> + b · Γ
)−1
µ(Sˆ) , (80)
with b .= 8nγ. More generally, if we let µt denote the mean operator for set St, then the optimal
classifier for `Sˆt,γ is given by
θ∗t
.
= θ∗(Sˆt) = 2 · Vtµt . (81)
(proof straightforward)
Lemma O Suppose Vt−1 exists. Then Vt exists iff the following holds true:{
c1,t 6= 1 ,
(1− c1,t)2 6= c0,tc2,t . (82)
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Proof We know that Xˆt is obtained from Xˆt−1 after permuting the shuffle part of observations at
indexes uA(t) and vA(t) in Xˆ(t−1)B by Pt (see Figure 6). So,
XˆtB = Xˆ(t−1)B + Xˆ(t−1)B(Pt − In)
= Xˆ(t−1)B + Xˆ(t−1)B(1uA(t)1
>
vA(t)
+ 1vA(t)1
>
uA(t)
− 1vA(t)1>vA(t) − 1uA(t)1>uA(t)) , (83)
where 1u ∈ Rn is the uth canonical basis vector. We also have
XˆtXˆ
>
t =
[
XAX
>
A XAXˆ
>
tB
XˆtBX
>
A XˆtBXˆ
>
tB
]
=
[
XAX
>
A XAXˆ
>
tB
XˆtBX
>
A Xˆ(t−1)BPtP
>
t Xˆ
>
(t−1)B
]
=
[
XAX
>
A XAXˆ
>
tB
XˆtBX
>
A Xˆ(t−1)BXˆ
>
(t−1)B
]
, (84)
because the inverse of a permutation matrix is its transpose. We recall that XA does not change
throughout permutations, only XB does. Hence,
XˆtXˆ
>
t = Xˆt−1Xˆ
>
t−1 +
[
0 XA(XˆtB − X(t−1)B)>
(XˆtB − X(t−1)B)X>A 0
]
= Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 +
[
0 XAΘuA(t),vA(t)Xˆ
>
(t−1)B
Xˆ(t−1)BΘuA(t),vA(t)X
>
A 0
]
, (85)
with ΘuA(t),vA(t)
.
= 1uA(t)1
>
vA(t)
+ 1vA(t)1
>
uA(t)
− 1vA(t)1>vA(t) − 1uA(t)1>uA(t) (symmetric, see eq. (83)
and example M). Now, remark that
XAΘuA(t),vA(t)Xˆ
>
(t−1)B
= XA(1uA(t)1
>
vA(t)
+ 1vA(t)1
>
uA(t)
− 1vA(t)1>vA(t) − 1uA(t)1>uA(t))Xˆ>tB
= (xuA(t))A(xtvA(t))
>
B + (xvA(t))A(xtuA(t))
>
B − (xvA(t))A(xtvA(t))>B − (xuA(t))A(xtuA(t))>B
= (xuA(t))A(xvB(t))
>
B + (xvA(t))A(xuB(t))
>
B − (xvA(t))A(xvB(t))>B − (xuA(t))A(xuB(t))>B (86)
= −((xuA(t))A − (xvA(t))A)((xuB(t))B − (xvB(t))B)>
= −(xuA(t) − xvA(t))A(xuB(t) − xvB(t))>B = −atb>t . (87)
Eq. (86) holds because of Lemma L. We finally get
XˆtXˆ
>
t = Xˆt−1Xˆ
>
t−1 − a+t b+t > − b+t a+t > , (88)
and so we have
Vt =
(
V−1t−1 − a+t b+t > − b+t a+t >
)−1
. (89)
We analyze when Vt can be computed. First notice that assuming Vt−1 exists implies its inverse also
exists, and so
det(V−1t−1 − a+t b+t >) = det(V−1t−1)det(Id − Vt−1a+t b+t >)
= det(V−1t−1)(1− b+t >Vt−1a+t )
= det(V−1t−1)(1− c1,t) , (90)
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where the last identity comes from Sylvester’s determinant formula. So, if in addition 1− c1,t 6= 0,
then
det
(
V−1t−1 − a+t b+t > − b+t a+t >
)
= det(V−1t−1 − a+t b+t >)det
(
Id −
(
V−1t−1 − a+t b+t >
)
b+t a
+
t
>)
= det(V−1t−1)(1− c1,t)det
(
Id −
(
V−1t−1 − a+t b+t >
)−1
b+t a
+
t
>
)
(91)
= det(V−1t−1)(1− c1,t)
(
1− a+t >
(
V−1t−1 − a+t b+t >
)−1
b+t
)
(92)
= det(V−1t−1)(1− c1,t)
(
1− a+t >
(
Vt−1 +
1
1− b+t >Vt−1a+t
· Vt−1a+t b+t >Vt−1
)
b+t
)
(93)
= det(V−1t−1)(1− c1,t)
(
1− c1,t − c0,tc2,t
1− c1,t
)
=
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t
det(Vt−1)
. (94)
Here, eq. (91) comes from eq. (90). Eq. (92) is another application of Sylvester’s determinant
formula. Eq. (92) is Sherman-Morrison formula. We immediately conclude on Lemma O.
If we now assume without loss of generality that V0 exists — which boils down to taking γ > 0,Γ 
0 —, then we get the existence of the complete sequence of matrices Vt (and thus the existence
of the sequence of optimal classifiers θ∗0,θ
∗
1, ...) provided the following invertibility condition is
satisfied.
(invertibility) For any t ≥ 1, (1− c1,t)2 6∈ {0, c0,tc2,t}.
Theorem P Suppose the invertibility assumption holds. Then we have:
1
2
· (θ∗t+1 − θ∗t ) = VtUt+1θ∗t + Vt+1εt ,∀t ≥ 0 ,
where εt is defined in eq. (76).
Proof We have from Lemma N, for any t ≥ 1,
1
2
· (θ∗t − θ∗t−1) = Vtµt − Vt−1µt−1
= ∆t−1µt−1 + Vtεt−1 , (95)
with ∆t
.
= Vt+1 − Vt. It comes from eq. (88),
∆t−1 =
(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t > − b+t a+t >
)−1
− Vt . (96)
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To simplify this expression, we need two consecutive applications of Sherman-Morrison’s inversion
formula:(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t > − b+t a+t >
)−1
=
(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t >
)−1
+
1
1− a+t >
(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t >
)−1
b+t
· Qt ,(97)
with
Qt
.
=
(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t >
)−1
b+t a
+
t
> (
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t >
)−1
,
(98)
and (
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t >
)−1
= Vt−1 +
1
1− b+t >Vt−1a+t
· Vt−1a+t b+t >Vt−1 . (99)
Let us define the following shorthand:
Σt
.
= Vt−1 +
1
1− b+t >Vt−1a+t
· Vt−1a+t b+t >Vt−1 . (100)
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Then, plugging together eqs. (97) and (99), we get:(
Xˆt−1Xˆ>t−1 + b · Γ− a+t b+t > − b+t a+t >
)−1
= Vt−1 +
1
1− b+t >Vt−1a+t
· Vt−1a+t b+t >Vt−1
+
1
1− a+t >Vt−1b+t − a
+
t
>Vt−1a+t ·b+t
>Vt−1b+t
1−b+t
>Vt−1a+t
· Σtb+t a+t >Σt
= Vt−1 +
1
1− c1,t · Vt−1a
+
t b
+
t
>
Vt−1
+
1
1− c1,t − c0,tc2,t1−c1,t
·
 Vt−1+
1
1−c1,t · Vt−1a+t b+t
>
Vt−1
 b+t a+t >
 Vt−1+
1
1−c1,t · Vt−1a+t b+t
>
Vt−1

= Vt−1 +
1
1− c1,t · Vt−1a
+
t b
+
t
>
Vt−1 +
1
1− c1,t − c0,tc2,t1−c1,t
· Vt−1b+t a+t >Vt−1
+
c0,t
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t · Vt−1b
+
t b
+
t
>
Vt−1 +
c2,t
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t · Vt−1a
+
t a
+
t
>
Vt−1
+
c0,tc2,t
(1− c1,t)((1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t) · Vt−1a
+
t b
+
t
>
Vt−1
= Vt−1 +
1− c1,t
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ·
(
Vt−1a+t b
+
t
>
Vt−1 + Vt−1b+t a
+
t
>
Vt−1
)
+
c0,t
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t · Vt−1b
+
t b
+
t
>
Vt−1 +
c2,t
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t · Vt−1a
+
t a
+
t
>
Vt−1
= Vt−1 +
1
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ·

(1− c1,t) · (Vt−1a+t b+t >Vt−1 + Vt−1b+t a+t >Vt−1)
+c0,t · Vt−1b+t b+t >Vt−1
+c2,t · Vt−1a+t a+t >Vt−1

= Vt−1 + Vt−1UtVt−1 . (101)
So,
1
2
· (θ∗t − θ∗t−1) = ∆t−1µt−1 + Vtεt−1
= Vt−1UtVt−1µt−1 + Vtεt−1
= Vt−1Utθ∗t−1 + Vtεt−1 , (102)
as claimed (end of the proof of Lemma P).
All that remains to do now is to unravel the relationship in Theorem P and quantify the exact
variation θ∗T − θ∗0 as a function of θ∗0 (which is the error-free optimal classifier), holding for any
permutation P∗. We therefore suppose that the invertibility assumption holds.
Theorem Q Suppose the invertibility assumption holds. For any T ≥ 1,
θ∗T − θ∗0 = (HT,0 − Id)θ∗0 +
T−1∑
t=0
HT,t+1λt . (103)
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Proof We recall first that we have from Theorem P, θ∗t+1 − θ∗t = Λtθ∗t + λt, ∀t ≥ 0. Equivalently,
θ∗t+1 = (Id + Λt)θ
∗
t + λt . (104)
Unravelling, we easily get ∀T ≥ 1,
θ∗T =
T−1∏
t=0
(Id + Λt)θ
∗
0 + λT−1 +
T−2∑
j=0
T−1∏
t=j+1
(Id + Λt)λj
= HT,0θ
∗
0 +
T−1∑
t=0
HT,t+1λt , (105)
which yields the statement of Theorem Q.
Since it applies to every permutation matrix, it applies to every entity resolution algorithm. Theorem
Q gives us a interesting expression for the deviation θ∗T − θ∗0 which can be used to derive bounds on
the distance between the two classifiers, even outside our privacy framework. We apply it below to
derive one such bound.
V.3 Assumptions: details and discussion
Our result relies on several assumptions that concern the permutation P∗ and its decomposition in
eq. (55), as well as on the data size n and regularization parameters γ,Γ. We make in this Section
more extensive comments on the assumptions we use.
((ε, τ)-accuracy) Equivalently, Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate iff both conditions below are satisfied:
1. the stretch in the shuffle space of errors on an observation due to permutations is bounded
by the total stretch of the observation:
$((xˆti − xi)B,wB) ≤ ε ·$(xi,w) + τ , ∀i ∈ [n] ,∀w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖2 = 1 .(106)
2. recall that xuA(t),xvA(t) are the observations in X whose shuffle parts are affected by Pt,
and xuB(t),xvB(t) are the observations in X whose shuffle parts are permuted by Pt. Then
the stretch of the errors due to Pt, (xuA(t) − xvA(t))A and (xuB(t) − xvB(t))B, is bounded
by the maximal stretch of the related observations:
$((xuF(t) − xvF(t))F,wF) ≤ ε · max
i∈{uF(t),vF(t)}
$(xi,w) + τ ,
∀F ∈ {A,B}, ∀w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖2 = 1 . (107)
↪→ Remarks on Definition 1:
Remark 1: eq. (18) in the (ε, τ)-accuracy assumption imposes that the stretch of all errors in Xˆt,
xˆti−xi, along directionw, be bounded by the stretch of the corresponding observations in X along
the same direction. Since the anchor parts of xˆti and xi coincide by convention, the stretch of the
error is in fact that measured on the shuffle set of features. Figure 8 gives a visual for that.
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xˆti   xi
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BwB
wA w
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⌧kwk2
Figure 8: If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, eq. (18) in Definition 1 reads as follows: for any vector w, the
norm of the error projected on w, in the shuffle space, is no more than a fraction of the norm of
w (red) plus a fraction of the norm of the projection of the observation along w in the complete
feature space.
Remark 2: Figure 9 illustrates the second part of the (ε, τ)-accuracy assumption. Infomally, stretch
of errors due to Pt is bounded by the maximal stretch of the related observations affected by Pt.
Remark 3: parameter τ is necessary in some way: if one picks w orthogonal to xi, then
$(xi,w) = ‖xi‖2| cos(xi,w)| = 0 while it may be the case that that $((xˆti − xi)B,wB) =
‖(xˆti − xi)B‖2| cos((xˆti − xi)B,wB)| 6= 0.
↪→ Remarks on Definition 4:
Remark 1: both conditions are in fact weak. They barely impose that the strength of regularization
(γλ↑1(Γ)) is proportional to a squared norm, while data size is no less than a potentially small
constant.
Remark 2: X2∗ can be of the same order as infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1): indeed, if all observations
have the same norm in Rd, then σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) = β(w)X2∗ for some 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. So the
problem can be reduced to roughly having
γλ↑1(Γ) ≥
(
1− (1− ε)
2
8
· β(w)
)
·X2∗ ,∀w ∈ Rd , (108)
which also shows that γλ↑1(Γ) has to be homogeneous to a square norm (Cf Remark 1).
V.4 Proof of Theorem 6
First, we shall see (Corollary W below) that the assumptions made guarantee the invertibility
condition in Theorem Q. From Theorem Q, we now investigate a general bound of the type
‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 ≤ a · ‖θ∗0‖2 + b , ∀T ≥ 1 . (109)
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Xˆt 1
B
A
B
A
Pt
X
 
 
Figure 9: Overview of eq. (19) for the (ε, τ)-accuracy assumption for elementary permutation Pt.
Left: effect of Pt on Xˆt−1; right: corresponding vectors whose stretch is used in the assumption.
Informally, the assumption says that the stretch of the (dashed, resp. plain) red vectors is bounded
by the maximal stretch among the (dashed, resp. plain) blue vectors (best viewed in color).
where a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 are two reals that we want as small as possible. We first need an intermediate
technical Lemma. Let µ({ai}) .= (1/n) ·
∑
i ai denote for short the average of {ai} with ai ≥ 0,∀i.
Let γ′ ≥ 0 be any real such that:
µ2({ai})
µ({a2i })
≤ (1− γ′) . (110)
Remark that the result is true for γ′ = 0 since µ({a2i })−µ2({ai}) is just the variance of {ai}, which
is non-negative. Remark also that we must have γ′ ≤ 1.
Lemma R
∑
i ((1− ε)ai − q)2 ≥ γ′(1− ε)2
∑
i a
2
i , ∀ε ≤ 1, q ∈ R.
Proof Remark that√
(1− γ′)µ({a2i }) = inf
k≥0
1
2
·
(
k +
1
k
· (1− γ′)µ({a2i })
)
, (111)
so we have:
µ({ai}) ≤
√
(1− γ′)µ({a2i }) (112)
≤ q
2(1− ε) +
(1− γ′)(1− ε)
2q
· µ({a2i }) . (113)
Ineq. (112) holds because of ineq. (110) and ineq. (112) holds because of eq. (111) and substituting
k
.
= q/(1− ε) ≥ 0. After reorganising, we obtain:
nq2 − 2(1− ε)q
∑
i
ai + (1− γ′)(1− ε)2
∑
i
a2i ≥ 0 , (114)
43
and so we obtain the inequality of:∑
i
((1− ε)ai − q)2 = nq2 − 2(1− ε)q
∑
i
ai + (1− ε)2
∑
i
a2i
≥ γ′(1− ε)2
∑
i
a2i , (115)
which allows to conclude the proof of Lemma R.
Let
γ′(X,w) .= 1− µ
2({$(xi,w)}ni=1)
µ({$2(xi,w)}ni=1)
, (116)
where we recall that µ({ai}) is the average in set {ai}. It is easy to remark that γ′(X,w) ∈ [0, 1]
and it can be used in Lemma R for the choice
{ai} .= {$(xi,w)}ni=1 . (117)
It is also not hard to see that as long as there exists two xi in X with a different direction, we shall
have γ′(X,w) > 0, ∀w.
Following Bhatia [1997], for any symmetric matrix M, we let λ↓(M) (resp. λ↑(M)) denote the
vector of eigenvalues arranged in decreasing (resp. increasing) order. So, λ↓1(M) (resp. λ
↑
1(M))
denotes the maximal (resp. minimal) eigenvalue of M.
Lemma S For any set S .= {ai}ni=1, let µ(S) and σ(S) denote the mean and standard deviation of
S. If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, then the eigenspectrum of Vt is bounded as below:
λ↓1(Vt) ≤
1
n
· 1
(1− ε)2 · infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
, (118)
λ↑1(Vt) ≥
1
2n
· 1
(1 + ε)2 · supw µ({$2(xi,w)}ni=1) + τ 2 + 4γλ↓1(Γ)
. (119)
Proof We first show the upperbound on λ↓1(Vt), and we start by showing that
λ↓1(Vt) ≤
1
n
· 1
(1− ε)2 · infw γ′(X,w)ς(X,w) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
, (120)
with
ς(X,w)
.
=
1
n
·
∑
i
$2(xi,w) . (121)
If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, it comes from the triangle inequality
|xˆ>tiw| = |x>i w + (xtiB − xiB)>wB|
≥ |x>i w| − |(xtiB − xiB)>wB|
≥ (1− ε)|x>i w| − τ‖w‖2 , (122)
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and so, using Lemma R with q .= τ and ai
.
= ‖xi‖2| cos(xi,w)|, we obtain the last inequality of:
‖Xˆ>t w‖22 =
∑
i
(xˆ>i w)
2
≥
∑
i
((1− ε)|x>i w| − τ‖w‖2)2
= ‖w‖22 ·
∑
i
((1− ε)$(xi,w)− τ)2
≥ ‖w‖22(1− ε)2 · γ′(X,w)
∑
i
$2(xi,w) . (123)
Therefore, if Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, we have
λ↓1(Vt)
.
=
inf
w
w>
(
XˆtXˆ
>
t + b · Γ
)
w
‖w‖22
−1
≤ 1
((1− ε)2 · infw γ′(X,w)
∑
i$
2(xi,w) + bλ
↑
1(Γ)
=
1
n
· 1
(1− ε)2 infw σ2(X,w) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
, (124)
where the last identity follows from
inf
w
σ2(X,w)
.
= inf
w
µ({$2(xi,w)})− µ2({$(xi,w)})
= inf
w
(
1− µ
2({$(xi,w)})
µ({$2(xi,w)})
)
· µ({$2(xi,w)})
= inf
w
(
1− µ
2({$(xi,w)})
µ({$2(xi,w)})
)
· 1
n
·
∑
i
$2(xi,w)
=
1
n
· inf
w
γ′(X,w)
∑
i
$2(xi,w) . (125)
This finishes the proof for ineq. (118). To show ineq. (119), we remark that if Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate,
it also comes from the triangle inequality
|xˆ>tiw| = |x>i w + (xtiB − xiB)>wB|
≤ |x>i w|+ |(xtiB − xiB)>wB|
≤ (1 + ε)|x>i w|+ τ‖w‖2 , (126)
and so,
‖Xˆ>t w‖22 =
∑
i
(xˆ>i w)
2
≤ ‖w‖22 ·
∑
i
((1 + ε)$(xi,w) + τ)
2
≤ ‖w‖22 ·
(
2(1 + ε)2
∑
i
$2(xi,w) + 2nτ
2
)
, (127)
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because (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2. Therefore, if Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, we have
λ↑1(Vt)
.
=
sup
w
w>
(
XˆtXˆ
>
t + b · Γ
)
w
‖w‖22
−1
≥ 1
2(1 + ε)2 · infw
∑
i$
2(xi,w) + 2nτ 2 + bλ
↑
1(Γ)
=
1
2n
· 1
(1 + ε)2 supw µ({$2(xi,w)}ni=1) + τ 2 + 4γλ↑1(Γ)
, (128)
This ends the proof of Lemma S.
Lemma T Suppose (1 − c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t 6= 05 and at 6= 0. Then Ut is negative semi-definite iff
(1 − c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t < 0. Otherwise, Ut is indefinite. In all cases, for any z ∈ {λ↓1(Ut), |λ↑1(Ut)|},
we have
z ≤ 2 + 3(c0,t + c2,t)
2|(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t| ·max{‖at‖
2
2, ‖bt‖22} . (129)
Proof Consider a block-vector following the column-block partition of Ut,
x˜
.
=
[
x
y
]
. (130)
Denote for short ρ .= (1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t. We have
Utx˜ =
1
ρ
·
[
(c2,t(a
>
t x) + (1− c1,t)(b>t y)) · at
((1− c1,t)(a>t x) + c0,t(b>t y)) · bt
]
. (131)
We see that the only possibility for x˜ to be an eigenvector is that x ∝ at and y ∝ bt (including the
null vector for at most one vector). We now distinguish two cases.
Case 1. c1,t = 1. In this case, Ut is block diagonal and so we get two eigenvectors:
Ut
[
at
0
]
= − 1
c0,tc2,t
·
[
c2,t · ata>t 0
0 c0,t · btb>t
] [
a
0
]
= − 1
λ(a+t )
·
[
at
0
]
, (132)
with (since ‖a+t ‖22 = ‖at‖22):
λ(a+t )
.
=
a+t
>
Vt−1a+t
‖a+t ‖22
, (133)
5This is implied by the invertibility assumption.
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and
Ut
[
0
bt
]
= − 1
λ(b+t )
·
[
0
bt
]
, λ(b+t )
.
=
b+t
>
Vt−1b+t
‖b+t ‖22
. (134)
We also remark that Ut is negative semi-definite.
Case 2. c1,t 6= 1. In this case, let us assume without loss of generality that for some α ∈ R∗,
x = α · at ,
y = bt .
In this case, we obtain
Utx˜ =
(1− c1,t)(a>t x) + c0,t(b>t y)
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ·
[
c2,t(a>t x)+(1−c1,t)(b>t y)
(1−c1,t)(a>t x)+c0,t(b>t y)
· at
bt
]
=
α(1− c1,t)‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ·
[
αc2,t‖at‖22+(1−c1,t)‖bt‖22
α(1−c1,t)‖at‖22+c0,t‖bt‖22 · at
bt
]
.
= λ · x˜ , (135)
and so we obtain the eigenvalue
λ =
α(1− c1,t)‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t , (136)
and we get from the eigenvector that α satisfies
α =
αc2,t‖at‖22 + (1− c1,t)‖bt‖22
α(1− c1,t)‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22
, (137)
and so
(1− c1,t)‖at‖22α2 + (c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22)α− (1− c1,t)‖bt‖22 = 0 . (138)
We note that the discriminant is
τ = (c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22)2 + 4(1− c1,t)2‖at‖22‖bt‖22 , (139)
which is always > 0. Therefore we always have two roots,
α± =
c2,t‖at‖22 − c0,t‖bt‖22 ±
√
(c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22)2 + 4(1− c1,t)2‖at‖22‖bt‖22
2(1− c1,t)‖at‖22
.(140)
yielding two non-zero eigenvalues,
λ±(Ut) =
1
2ρ
·
(
c2,t‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22 ±
√
(c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22)2 + 4(1− c1,t)2‖at‖22‖bt‖22
)
.(141)
Let us analyze the sign of both eigenvalues. For the numerator of λ− to be negative, we have
equivalently after simplification
(c2,t‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22)2 < (c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22)2 + 4(1− c1,t)2‖at‖22‖bt‖22 , (142)
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which simplifies in c0,tc2,t < (1− c1,t)2, i.e. ρ > 0. Hence, λ− < 0.
Now, for λ+, it is easy to check that its sign is that of ρ. When ρ > 0, we have λ+ ≥ |λ−|, and
because a2 + b2 ≤ (|a|+ |b|)2, we get
λ↓1(Ut) = λ+ ≤
1
2
· (c2,t‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22 + |c0,t‖bt‖22 − c2,t‖at‖22|+ 2(1− c1,t)‖at‖2‖bt‖2)
≤ c2,t‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22 + (1− c1,t)‖at‖2‖bt‖2 . (143)
Now, remark that because Vt is positive definite,
c0,t − 2c1,t + c2,t .= a+t >Vta+t − 2a+t >Vtb+t + b+t >Vtb+t
= (a+t − b+t )>Vt(a+t − b+t )
≥ 0 , (144)
showing that c1,t ≤ (c0,t + c2,t)/2. So we get from ineq. (143),
λ↓1(Ut) ≤
1
ρ
·
(
c2,t‖at‖22 + c0,t‖bt‖22 +
(
1 +
c0,t + c2,t
2
)
‖at‖2‖bt‖2
)
≤ 1
ρ
·
(
1 +
3
2
· (c0,t + c2,t)
)
·max{‖at‖22, ‖bt‖22}
≤ 2 + 3(c0,t + c2,t)
2((1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t) ·max{‖at‖
2
2, ‖bt‖22} . (145)
When ρ < 0, we remark that λ+ < λ− and so Ut is negative semi-definite.
Whenever c1,t 6= 1, it is then easy to check that for any z ∈ {|λ+|, |λ−|}, ineq. (145) brings
z ≤ 2 + 3(c0,t + c2,t)
2|(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t| ·max{‖at‖
2
2, ‖bt‖22} . (146)
Whenever c1,t = 1 (Case 1.), it is also immediate to check that for any z ∈ {| − 1/λ(a+t )|, | −
1/λ(b+t )|},
z ≤ max
{
1
c0,t
,
1
c2,t
}
·max{‖at‖22, ‖bt‖22}
<
(
1 +
3
c0,t
+
3
c2,t
)
·max{‖at‖22, ‖bt‖22}
=
2 + 3(c0,t + c2,t)
2|(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t| ·max{‖at‖
2
2, ‖bt‖22} . (147)
Once we remark that c1,t = 1 implies ρ < 0, we obtain the statement of Lemma T.
Lemma U If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate, then the following holds true:
‖b+t ‖22 = ‖bt‖22 ≤ 2ξ ·X2∗ , (148)
‖a+t ‖22 = ‖at‖22 ≤ 2ξ ·X2∗ , (149)
where ξ is defined in eq. (20).
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Proof To prove ineq. (148), we make two applications of point 2. in the (ε, τ)-accuracy assumption
with F .= B:
$((xuB(t) − xvB(t))F,wF) ≤ ε · max
i∈{uB(t),vB(t)}
$(xi,w) + τ ,
∀w ∈ Rd : ‖w‖2 = 1 . (150)
Fix w .= (1/‖xvB(t)‖2) · xvB(t). We get:
|(xvB(t) − xuB(t))>BxvB(t)B| ≤ ε ·max{|x>uB(t)xvB(t)|, ‖xvB(t)‖22}+ τ · ‖xvB(t)‖2
≤ ε ·X2∗ + τ ·X∗ = ξ ·X2∗ . (151)
Fix w .= (1/‖xuB(t)‖2) · xuB(t). We get:
|(xuB(t) − xvB(t))>BxuB(t)B | ≤ ε ·max{|x>uB(t)xvB(t)|, ‖xuB(t)‖22}+ τ · ‖xuB(t)‖2
≤ ε ·X2∗ + τ ·X∗ = ξ ·X2∗ . (152)
Folding together ineqs. (151) and (152) yields
‖(xvB(t) − xuB(t))B‖22 = (xvB(t) − xuB(t))>B (xvB(t) − xuB(t))B
≤ |(xvB(t) − xuB(t))>BxvB(t)B|+ |(xvB(t) − xuB(t))>BxuB(t)B|
≤ 2ξ ·X2∗ . (153)
We get
‖b+t ‖22 = ‖bt‖22 = ‖(xvB(t) − xuB(t))B‖22 ≤ 2ξ ·X2∗ , (154)
which yields ineq. (148). To get ineq. (149), we switch F .= B by F .= A in our application of point
2. in the (ε, τ)-accuracy assumption.
Lemma V If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate and the data-model calibration assumption holds,
ci,t ≤ 1
12
,∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2} . (155)
Proof We remark that
c0,t
.
= a+t
>
Vta
+
t
≤ λ↓1(Vt)‖a+t ‖22
≤ 2λ↓1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ ,
and for the same reasons, c2,t ≤ 2λ↓1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ . Hence, it comes from the proof of Lemma T that we
also have c2,t ≤ 2λ↓1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ . Using ineq. (118) in Lemma S, we thus obtain for any i ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
ci,t ≤ 1
n
· 2ξ ·X
2
∗
(1− ε)2 · infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
=
ξ
n
· 1
4
· X
2
∗
(1−ε)2
8
· infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + γλ↑1(Γ)
≤ 1
4
· 1
4
· 1 < 1
12
, (156)
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as claimed. The last inequality uses the data-model calibration assumption.
Corollary W Suppose Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate for any t ≥ 1 and the data-model calibration assump-
tion holds. Then the invertibility assumption holds.
Proof From Lemma V, we conclude that (1− c1,t)2 > 121/144 > 1/144 > c0,tc2,t > 0, hence the
invertibility assumption holds.
Lemma X If Pt is (ε, τ)-accurate and the data-model calibration assumption holds, the following
holds true: Id + Λt  0 and
λ↓1 (Λt) ≤
ξ
n
. (157)
Proof First note that λ↑1(Vt) ≥ 1/(γλ↓1(Γ)) > 0 and so Vt  0, which implies that Λt .= 2VtUt =
2V
1/2
t (V
1/2
t UtV
1/2
t )V
−1/2
t , i.e. Λt is similar to a symmetric matrix (V
1/2
t UtV
1/2
t ) and therefore has only
real eigenvalues. We get
λ↓1 (Λt) = λ
↓
1 (2VtUt)
≤ 2 · λ↓1(Vt) ·
(
1 +
3
2
· (c0,t + c2,t)
)
·max{‖at‖22, ‖bt‖22} (158)
≤ 2 + 3(c0,t + c2,t)|(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t| · 2λ
↓
1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ . (159)
Ineq. (158) is due to Lemma T and ineq. (159) is due to Lemma U. We now use Lemma V and its
proof, which shows that
(1− c1,t)2 − c0,tc2,t ≥
(
1− 1
12
)2
− 1
144
=
5
6
. (160)
Letting U .= 2λ↓1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ for short, we thus get from the proof of Lemma V:
λ↓1 (Λt) ≤
6
5
· (2 + 3(U + U))U
=
6
5
· (2U + 6U2) . (161)
Now we want λ↓1 (Λt) ≤ ξ/n, which translates into a second-order inequality for U , whose solution
imposes the following upperbound on U :
6U ≤ −1 +
√
1 +
5ξ
n
. (162)
We can indeed forget the lowerbound for U , whose sign is negative while U ≥ 0.
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Since
√
1 + x ≥ 1 + (x/2)− (x2/8) for x ≥ 0 (and ξ/n ≥ 0), we get the sufficient condition
for ineq. (162) to be satisfied:
12λ↓1(Vt)ξ ·X2∗ ≤
5ξ
2n
− 25
8
·
(
ξ
n
)2
. (163)
Now, it comes from Lemma S that a sufficient condition for ineq. (163) is that
ξ
n
· 12X
2
∗
(1− ε)2 · infw σ2(X,w) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
≤ 5ξ
2n
− 25
8
·
(
ξ
n
)2
, (164)
which, after simplification, is equivalent to
3
5
· X
2
∗
(1−ε)2
8
· infw σ2(X,w) + γλ↑1(Γ)
+
5ξ
4n
≤ 1 . (165)
But, the data-model calibration assumption implies that the left-hand side is no more than (3/5) +
(5/16) = 73/80 < 1, and ineq. (157) follows.
It also trivially follows that Id + Λt has only real eigenvalues. To prove that they are all strictly
positive, we know that the only potentially negative eigenvalue of Ut, λ− (Lemma T) is smaller
in absolute value to λ↓1(Ut). Vt being positive definite, we thus have under the (ε, τ)-accuracy
assumption and data-model calibration:
λ↑1(Id + Λt) ≥ 1−
ξ
n
≥ 1− 1
4
=
3
4
> 0 , (166)
showing Id + Λt is positive definite. This ends the proof of Lemma X.
Let 0 ≤ T+ ≤ T denote the number of elementary permutations that act between classes, and
ρ
.
= T+/T denote the proportion of such elementary permutations among all.
Theorem Y Suppose P∗ is (ε, τ)-accurate and α-bounded, and the data-model calibration assump-
tion holds. Then the following holds for all T ≥ 1:
‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 ≤
ξ
n
· T 2 ·
(
‖θ∗0‖2 +
√
ξ
4X∗
· ρ
)
≤
(
ξ
n
)α
·
(
‖θ∗0‖2 +
√
ξ
4X∗
· ρ
)
. (167)
Proof We use Theorem Q, which yields from the triangle inequality:
‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 = ‖(HT,0 − Id)θ∗0‖2 +
∥∥∥∥∥
T−1∑
t=0
HT,t+1λt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
. (168)
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Denote for short q .= ξ/n. It comes from the definition of Hi,j and Lemma X the first inequality of:
λ↓1 (HT,0 − Id) ≤ (1 + q)T − 1
≤ T 2q , (169)
where the second inequality holds because
(
T
k
)
qk ≤ (Tq)k ≤ Tq for k ≥ 1 whenever Tq ≤ 1,
which is equivalent to
T ≤ n
ξ
, (170)
which is implied by the condition of α-bounded permutation size (n/ξ ≥ 4 ≥ 1 from the data-model
calibration assumption). We thus get
‖ (HT,0 − Id)θ∗0‖2 ≤ T 2q · ‖θ∗0‖2 . (171)
Using ineq. (168), this shows the statement of the Theorem with (187). The upperbound comes
from the fact that the factor in the right hand side is no more than (ξ/n)α for some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
provided this time the stronger constraint holds:
T ≤
(
n
ξ
) 1−α
2
, (172)
which is the condition of α-boundedness.
Let us now have a look at the shift term in eq. (168), which depends only on the mistakes between
classes done during the permutation (which changes the mean operator between permutations),
R
.
=
T−1∑
t=0
HT,t+1λt . (173)
Using eq. (77), we can simplify R since λt = 2Vt+1εt, so if we define G.,. from H.,. as follows, for
0 ≤ j ≤ i:
Gi,j
.
= 2Hi,jVj , (174)
then we get
R
.
=
T−1∑
t=0
GT,t+1εt , (175)
where we recall that εt
.
= µt+1 − µt is the shift in the mean operator, which is the null vector
whenever Pt acts in a specific class (yuA(t) = yvA(t)). To see this, we remark
εt
.
= µt+1 − µt
=
∑
i
yi ·
[
xiA
x(t+1)iB
]
−
∑
i
yi ·
[
xiA
xtiB
]
=
∑
i
yi ·
[
0
x(t+1)iB
]
−
∑
i
yi ·
[
0
xtiB
]
=
[
0∑
i yi · (x(t+1)iB − xtiB)
]
.
=
[
0
εtB
]
, (176)
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which can be simplified further since we work with the elementary permutation Pt,
εtB = yuA(t) · (xvB(t) − xuB(t))B + yvA(t) · (xuB(t) − xvB(t))B
= (yuA(t) − yvA(t)) · (xvB(t) − xuB(t))B . (177)
Hence,
‖εt‖2 = ‖εtB‖2 = 1yuA(t) 6=yvA(t) · ‖(xvB(t) − xuB(t))B‖2
≤ 1yuA(t) 6=yvA(t) ·
√
2ξ)X∗ , (178)
from Lemma U, and we see that indeed ‖εt‖2 = 0 when the elementary permutation occurs within
observations of the same class.
It follows from the data-model calibration assumption and Lemma X that
λ↓1(Vt) ≤
1
n
· 1
(1− ε)2 · infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + 8γλ↑1(Γ)
=
1
8nX2∗
· X
2
∗
(1−ε)2
8
· infw σ2({$(xi,w)}ni=1) + γλ↑1(Γ)
≤ 1
8nX2∗
. (179)
Using [Bhatia, 1997, Problem III.6.14], Lemma X and ineq. (179), we also obtain
λ↓1 (GT,t+1) ≤ 2 ·
(
1 +
ξ
n
)T−t−1
· 1
8nX2∗
. (180)
So,
‖R‖2 ≤
T−1∑
t=0
λmax (GT,t+1) ‖εt‖2
≤ 1
2
√
2
·
T−1∑
t=0
1yuA(t) 6=yvA(t) ·
(
1 +
ξ
n
)T−t−1
·
√
ξ
nX∗
=
1
2X∗
·
√
ξ
2
·
T−1∑
t=0
1yuA(t) 6=yvA(t) ·
(
1 +
ξ
n
)T−t−1
· ξ
n
, (181)
from ineq. (178). Assuming T+ ≤ T errors are made by permutations between classes and recalling
q
.
= ξ/n, we see that the largest upperbound for ‖R‖2 in ineq. (181) is obtained when all T+ errors
happen at the last elementary permutations in the sequence in P∗, so we get that
‖R‖2 ≤ 1
2X∗
·
√
ξ
2
·
T+−1∑
t=0
q(1 + q)T−t−1
=
1
2X∗
·
√
ξ
2
· q(1 + q)T−T+
T+−1∑
t=0
(1 + q)T+−t−1
=
1
2X∗
·
√
ξ
2
· (1 + q)T−T+((1 + q)T+ − 1) . (182)
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It comes from ineq. (169) (1 + q)T+ − 1 ≤ T 2+q and
(1 + q)T−T+ ≤ (T − T+)2q + 1
≤
(
n
ξ
)1−α
· ξ
n
+ 1
=
(
ξ
n
)α
+ 1
≤ 1
4
+ 1 <
√
2 . (183)
The last line is due to the data-model calibration assumption. We finally get from ineq. (182)
‖R‖2 ≤
√
ξ
2X∗
· ξ
n
· T 2+
=
ξ
3
2
4X∗n
· T 2+ . (184)
We also remark that if P∗ is α-bounded, since T+ ≤ T , we also have:
ξ
3
2
4X∗n
· T 2+ ≤
ξ
3
2
4X∗n
·
(
n
ξ
)1−α
=
√
ξ
4X∗
·
(
ξ
n
)α
. (185)
Summarizing, we get
‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 ≤ a(T ) · ‖θ∗0‖2 + b(T+) , (186)
where
a(T )
.
=
ξ
n
· T 2 ≤
(
ξ
n
)α
, (187)
b(T+)
.
=
ξ
3
2
4X∗n
· T 2+ ≤
√
ξ
4X∗
·
(
ξ
n
)α
, (188)
which yields the proof of Theorem Y.
Theorem Y easily yields the proof of Theorem 6.
V.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Remark that for any example (x, y), we have from Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
|y(θ∗T − θ∗0)>x| = |(θ∗T − θ∗0)>x| ≤ ‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2‖x‖2
≤
(
ξ
n
)α
·
(
‖θ∗0‖2 +
√
ξ
4X∗
· ρ
)
·X∗
=
(
ξ
n
)α
·
(
‖θ∗0‖2X∗ +
√
ξ
4
· ρ
)
. (189)
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So, to have |y(θ∗T − θ∗0)>x| < κ for some κ > 0, it is sufficient that
n > ξ ·
(‖θ∗0‖2X∗
κ
+
√
ξ
4κ
· ρ
) 1
α
. (190)
In this case, for any example (x, y) such that y(θ∗0)
>x > κ, then
y(θ∗T )
>x = y(θ∗0)
>x+ y(θ∗T − θ∗0)>x
≥ y(θ∗0)>x− |y(θ∗T − θ∗0)>x|
> κ− κ = 0 , (191)
and we get the statement of the Theorem.
V.6 Proof of Theorem 9
We want to bound the difference between the loss over the true data for the optimal (unknown)
classifier θ∗0 and the classifier we learn from entity resolved data, θ
∗
T ,
∆S(θ
∗
0,θ
∗
T )
.
= `S,γ(θ
∗
T )− `S,γ(θ∗0) . (192)
Simple arithmetics and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality allow to derive:
∆S(θ
∗
0,θ
∗
T ) =
1
2n
·
(
(θ∗T − θ∗0)>
(∑
i
yixi
)
+
1
4
·
∑
i
(
((θ∗0)
>xi)2 − ((θ∗T )>xi)2
))
=
1
2n
·
(
(θ∗T − θ∗0)>µ0 +
1
4
·
∑
i
(
(θ∗0 − θ∗T )>xi
) (
(θ∗0 + θ
∗
T )
>xi
))
≤ 1
2
·
(
1
n
· ‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2‖µ0‖2 + ‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2‖θ∗T + θ∗0‖2X2∗
)
= ‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 ·
(‖µ0‖2
2n
+
1
2
· ‖θ∗T + θ∗0‖2X2∗
)
. (193)
We now need to bound ‖θ∗T + θ∗0‖2, which is easy since the triangle inequality yields
‖θ∗T + θ∗0‖2 = ‖θ∗T − θ∗0 + 2θ∗0‖2
≤ ‖θ∗T − θ∗0‖2 + 2‖θ∗0‖2 , (194)
and so Theorem Y yields:
‖θ∗T + θ∗0‖2 ≤ 2‖θ∗0‖2 +
ξ
n
· T 2 ·
(
‖θ∗0‖2 +
√
ξ
4X∗
· ρ
)
= 2‖θ∗0‖2 +
ξ(δm + δρ)
nX∗
· T 2 , (195)
where δm
.
= ‖θ∗0‖2X∗ is the maximum margin for the optimal (unknown) classifier and δρ .=
√
ξρ/4
is a penalty due to class-mismatch permutations. Denote for short
η
.
= ‖θ∗0‖2 +
√
ξ
4X∗
· ρ = δm + δρ
X∗
. (196)
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We finally obtain, letting δµ0
.
= ‖µ0‖2/(nX∗) (∈ [0, 1]) denote the normalized mean-operator for
the true dataset,
∆S(θ
∗
0,θ
∗
T ) ≤
ξη
n
· T 2 ·
(‖µ0‖2
2n
+
ξηX2∗
2n
· T 2 + ‖θ∗0‖2X2∗
)
=
ξη
n
· T 2 ·
(
‖µ0‖2
2n
+ ‖θ∗0‖2X2∗ ·
(
1 +
ξ
2n
· T 2
)
+
ξ
3
2ρX∗
8n
· T 2
)
=
ξηX∗
n
· T 2 ·
(
‖µ0‖2
2nX∗
+ ‖θ∗0‖2X∗ ·
(
1 +
ξ
2n
· T 2
)
+
ξ
3
2ρ
8n
· T 2
)
=
ξ(δm + δρ)
n
· T 2 ·
(
δµ0
2
+ δm ·
(
1 +
ξ
2n
· T 2
)
+ δρ · ξ
2n
· T 2
)
. (197)
Let us denote for short
C(n)
.
=
ξ
n
· T 2 . (198)
We know that under the α-boundedness condition,
C(n) ≤
(
ξ
n
)α
= o(1) , (199)
and we finally get from eq. (197),
∆S(θ
∗
0,θ
∗
T ) ≤
δm + δρ
2
· C(n) · (δµ0 + δm · (2 + C(n)) + δρ · C(n))
≤ δm,ρ
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ
) · C(n) , (200)
with δm,ρ
.
= (δm + δρ)/2 the average of the margin and class-mismatch penalties. We have used in
the last inequality the fact that under the data-model calibration assumption, C(n) ≤ (1/4)α ≤ 1.
This ends the proof of Theorem 9.
V.7 Proof of Theorem 10
The Rademacher complexity is a fundamental notion in learning [Bartlett and Mendelson, 2002].
Letting Σn
.
= {−1, 1}n, the empirical Rademacher complexity of hypothesis class H is:
Rn
.
= Eσ∼Σn sup
h∈H
{ES[σ(x)h(x)]} . (201)
When it comes to linear classifiers, two parameters are fundamental to bound the empirical
Rademacher complexity: the maximum norm of the classifier and the maximum norm of an
observation [Kakade et al., 2008, Patrini et al., 2016a]. There are therefore two Rademacher
complexities that are relevant to our setting:
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• the one related to the unknown optimal classifier θ0, Rn(θ0), to which we attach maximum
classifier norm θ∗ and example norm X∗. It is well-known that we have [Kakade et al., 2008,
Theorem 3], [Patrini et al., 2016a, Lemma 1]:
Rn(θ0) ≤ X∗θ∗√
n
. (202)
• the one related to the optimal classifier that we build on our observed data, Rn(θT ).
Notice that this latter one should also be computed over the optimal dataset S. One may wonder
how this would degrade any empirically computable bound, that would depend on SˆT instead of S
in the supremum in eq. (201). It can be shown that entity resolution has this very desirable property
in the vertical partition setting that we can in fact use any empirical upperbound on X∗, the way the
bound in eq. (201) is computed is not going to be affected. This is what we now show.
Lemma Z Let XˆT∗
.
= maxi ‖xˆT i‖2 and θˆ∗ be any upperbound for ‖θT‖2. We have
Rn(θT ) ≤ XˆT∗θˆ∗√
n
(203)
Proof The proof follows the basic steps of [Patrini et al., 2016a, Lemma 1], with a twist to handle
the replacement of X∗ by XˆT∗. We give the proof for completeness. We have the key observation
that ∀σ ∈ Σn,
arg sup
θ∈H∗
{
ES[σ(x)θ>x]
}
=
1
n
arg sup
θ∈H∗
{∑
i
σiθ
>xT i
}
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
‖∑i σixT i‖2
∑
i
σixT i . (204)
So,
Rn = EΣn sup
h∈H
{ES[σ(x)h(x)]}
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
n
EΣn
[
(
∑
x σ(x)x)
> (
∑
x σ(x)x)
‖∑x σ(x)x‖2
]
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
n
EΣn
[
‖
∑
x
σ(x)x‖2
]
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
n
× 1|Σn|
∑
Σn
√∑
i
‖xi‖22 +
∑
i1 6=i2
σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
√∑
i ‖xi‖22
n
× 1|Σn|
∑
Σn
√
1 +
∑
i1 6=i2 σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2∑
i ‖xi‖22
.
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Using the fact that
√
1 + x ≤ 1 + x/2, we have
Rn ≤ supH∗ ‖θ‖2
√∑
i ‖xi‖22
n
× 1|Σn|
∑
Σn
(
1 +
∑
i1 6=i2 σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2
2
∑
i ‖xi‖22
)
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
√∑
i ‖xi‖22
n
(
1 +
1
2|Σn|
∑
Σn
∑
i1 6=i2 σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2∑
i ‖xi‖22
)
=
supH∗ ‖θ‖2
√∑
i ‖xˆT i‖22
n
(
1 +
1
2|Σn|
∑
Σn
∑
i1 6=i2 σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2∑
i ‖xi‖22
)
. (205)
We prove eq. (205). Because P∗ is a permutation, we have the penultimate identity of:∑
i
‖xˆT i‖22 =
∑
i
‖(xˆT i)A‖22 +
∑
i
‖(xˆT i)B‖22 (206)
=
∑
i
‖(xi)A‖22 +
∑
i
‖(xˆT i)B‖22 (207)
=
∑
i
‖(xi)A‖22 +
∑
i
‖(xi)B‖22 (208)
=
∑
i
‖xi‖22 . (209)
The second identity follows from the fact that P∗ acts on indexes from B. We obtain
Rn ≤ XˆT∗θˆ∗√
n
(210)
after remarking, following [Patrini et al., 2016a, Lemma 1], that because Rademacher variables are
i.i.d.,
∑
Σn
σi1σi2 = 0, which yields:∑
Σn
∑
i1 6=i2 σi1σi2x
>
i1
xi2∑
i ‖xi‖22
=
1∑
i ‖xi‖22
∑
i1 6=i2
x>i1xi2
∑
Σn
σi1σi2 = 0 , (211)
and ends the proof of Lemma Z.
We now remark that we have from Theorem 6 and the triangle inequality:
‖θ∗T‖2 ≤
(
1 + C(n) ·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
))
· ‖θ∗0‖2 , (212)
which means that we can let
θˆ∗
.
=
(
1 + C(n) ·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
))
· θ∗ . (213)
Letting L denote the Lipschitz constant for the Taylor loss, we get from [Bartlett and Mendelson,
2002, Theorem 7] that with probability ≥ 1− δ over the drawing of S ∼ Dn,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[
y(θ∗T )
>x ≤ 0] ≤ `S,γ(θ∗T ) + 2LRn(θ∗T ) +
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
. (214)
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So, using Theorem 9, ineq. (214) implies
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[
y(θ∗T )
>x ≤ 0] ≤ `S,γ(θ∗0) + δm,ρ (δµ0 + 6δm,ρ) · C(n) + 2LX∗√n · θˆ∗ +
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
≤ `S,γ(θ∗0) + δm,ρ
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ
) · C(n)
+
2LX∗√
n
·
(
1 + C(n) ·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
))
· θ∗ +
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
≤ `S,γ(θ∗0) + δm,ρ
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ
) · C(n)
+
2LX∗√
n
·
(
1 + C(n) ·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
))
· θ∗ +
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
= `S,γ(θ
∗
0) +
2LX∗θ∗√
n
+
√
ln(2/δ)
2n
+ U(n) , (215)
with
U(n) =
(
δm,ρ
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ
)
+
2LX∗θ∗√
n
·
(
1 +
δρ
δm
))
· C(n)
=
(
δm,ρ
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ
)
+
2L√
n
· (δm + δρ)
)
· C(n)
= δm,ρ ·
(
δµ0 + 6δm,ρ +
4L√
n
)
· C(n) , (216)
achieving the proof of Theorem 10.
VI Cryptographic longterm keys, entity resolution and learn-
ing
We stressed the importance of Theorem 6, which is applicable regardless of the permutation matrix
and in fact also relevant to the non private setting. While we think this Theorem may be useful
to optimize entity resolution algorithms with the objective to learn more accurately afterwards, a
question is how does our theory fits to the actual system we are using, cryptographic longterm keys,
(CLKs, Schnell et al. [2011]).
To summarize, a CLK proceed in two phases: (i) it hashes the input in a set of objects (e.g.
bigrams, digits, etc.), (ii) for each object, it hashes several times its binary code into a Bloom filter
of fixed size, initialized to 0, flipping the zeroes to 1 for each hasing value. Hence, computing a
CLK amounts to putting at most hs bits to 1 in an array of l bits, where h is the number of hash
functions and s is the number of objects. Comparing two binary CLKs z and z′ is done with the
dice coefficient:
D(z, z′) .= 2× 1(z ∧ z
′)
1(z) + 1(z′)
, (217)
where 1(z) is the set on indexes having 1 in the Bloom filter (binary) encoding of z. Since
D(z, z′) ∈ [0, 1], a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1] is in general learned, above which z and z′ are considered
representing the same inputs.
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CLKs have the key property that if the two inputs are the same, then D(z, z′) = 1 ≥ τ , for
any applicable τ . Therefore, whenever two entities from A and B have the same input values, if
these inputs do not have errors, then their Dice coefficient is maximal and they are recognized as
representing the same entity.
Suppose for simplicity that we study the (ε, δ)-accuracy assumptions on binary vectors, the
common part of A and B being the representation of the CLK. In this case, ignoring the features
not in the Bloom filter, it is not hard to see that the unit vector w which maximizes the stretch
$((xˆti−xi)CLK,wCLK) (the features of CLK are included in those of B) is the one whose coordinates
over the l bits of the CLK, in absolute value, are proportional to the coordinates of xˆti ⊕ xi, where
⊕ is the exclusive or. We get for this w
$((xˆti − xi)CLK,wCLK) =
√
1(xˆti ⊕ xi) , (218)
while for this w, we also get
$(xi,w) =
√
1(xi ∧ ¬xˆti) . (219)
Assuming the CLKs have exactly hs bits to 1, we have 1(xˆti ⊕ xi) = 2 · 1(xi ∧ ¬xˆti). We have√
2 − 1 ≈ 0.414, so depending on the actual norm of the observations, we might be able to find
δ > 0 such that (ε, δ)-accuracy holds for ε < 1. Of course, (i) we forgot all the other features of
B and (ii) we have only analyzed (ε, δ)-accuracy for the choices ofw that maximize the left-hand
side of eq. (218). However, this simplistic analysis hints on the fact that entity resolution based on
CLKs is not just relevant to private entity resolution, it may also be a good choice for learning in
our setting.
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